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Abstract
There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the
value of their products. We consider a model in which a policymaker is able to punish
such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively
influences rational buyers, and analyze the effects of policy under different welfare
objectives. We establish precise conditions where policy optimally permits a positive
level of false advertising, and show how these conditions vary intuitively with demand
and market parameters. We also consider the implications for product investment and
industry self-regulation, and connect our results to the literature on demand curvature.
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1 Introduction
Buyers are often reliant on firms to obtain information about product characteristics. To
exploit this, some firms deliberately engage in what we call ‘false advertising’ - the use of
incorrect or exaggerated product claims. They do this in a range of different contexts, and
despite potential legal penalties. Recent policy cases include Dannon which paid $21m to
39 US states after it misled consumers about the health benefits of its Activia yogurt prod-
ucts; Skechers which paid $40m after falsely stating that its toning shoes helped with weight
loss; and Kellogg’s which paid $5m for wrongly claiming that its breakfast cereals enhanced
childrens’ immune systems. Similarly, in some related examples, car manufacturers such as
Volkswagen, Hyundai and Kia have incurred a series of multi-million dollar penalties after
cheating tests in order to make false claims about their emission levels or fuel efficiency.1
Additional evidence also comes from academic research, which carefully documents the ex-
istence of false advertising and its ability to increase demand.2
However, despite this, the theoretical literature has largely ignored false advertising. In
this paper, we develop a model where false advertising arises in equilibrium and actively
influences rational buyers. Tougher legal penalties reduce the frequency of false adverts,
but also increase their credibility. As a result of the latter effect, we show when and how
stronger penalties can reduce buyer and social welfare. In particular, by using some results on
demand curvature, the paper derives precise conditions on demand and market parameters
such that a policymaker optimally uses a low penalty to permit a strictly positive level of
false advertising. We then consider several wider issues including investment incentives and
industry self-regulation.
In more detail, Section 2 introduces our main model where a monopolist is privately
informed about its product quality. While we later extend the results in a number of ways,
we initially focus on the case where quality is either ‘high’ or ‘low’ and where the two
types have symmetric marginal costs. The policymaker first commits to a penalty for false
advertising. Then having learned its type, the firm chooses a price and a (possibly false)
claim about its quality. Buyers subsequently update their beliefs and make their purchase
decisions, before the policymaker instigates any penalties. We believe this set-up closely
approximates many important markets where buyers are unable to verify claims, or can only
do so after a long time, and where policy plays a key role in regulating advertising.
Section 3 characterizes an equilibrium with some appealing economic properties, in which
the high type advertises truthfully but the low type may engage in false advertising. This
equilibrium does not resemble that of a standard price signaling game due to the assumption
1For further details, see https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings, goo.gl/yw437p;
goo.gl/J1yJPx, goo.gl/7GWYsz. Accessed 10/23/17.
2E.g. Zinman and Zitzewitz (2016), Rao and Wang (2016), and Cawley et al (2013). See also Mayzlin et
al (2014) for false advertising in the form of fake user reviews.
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of symmetric costs. Instead, it smoothly unifies several otherwise separate cases depending on
the level of the penalty. Firstly when the penalty is large, there is no false advertising. Here,
as in the standard disclosure literature, quality claims are verifiable and product quality is
perfectly revealed within a full separating equilibrium. Secondly when the penalty is small,
the low type always conducts false advertising within a full pooling equilibrium. In this
case, advertising is cheap talk and so buyers simply maintain their prior beliefs. Finally,
when the penalty is moderate, our equilibrium involves a novel form of partially verifiable
advertising. Here, the low type mixes between i) pooling with the high type by engaging in
false advertising with a relatively high price, and ii) advertising truthfully with a relatively
low price. Therefore when buyers observe a high claim, they positively update their belief
that quality is high. Hence, in contrast to full separation, false advertising does arise in
equilibrium but unlike in full pooling, advertised claims actively inflate buyers’ beliefs beyond
their priors even when false.
Section 4 analyzes how marginal changes in the penalty affect a variety of welfare mea-
sures. We first consider buyer surplus. Here, a reduction in the penalty increases the prob-
ability of false advertising and generates two opposing effects. The first ‘persuasion’ effect
harms buyers by prompting them to buy too many units at an inflated price. The second
effect derives from the impact of false advertising on damaging the credibility of claims. This
issue goes back to at least Nelson (1974) and is well-documented empirically with studies
showing how deception lowers credibility and reduces buyers’ purchase intentions (e.g. Darke
and Richie 2007, Newell et al 1998). However, rather than viewing this impact as detrimen-
tal, we document a beneficial ‘price’ effect whereby false advertising counteracts monopoly
power by lowering buyers’ quality expectations and prompting lower prices.
To compare these two effects under a relatively general form of demand, we utilize some
recent results on demand curvature and cost pass-through (Weyl and Fabinger 2013, Ander-
son and Renault 2003). Such results are being used in an increasing number of applications,
such as price discrimination (e.g. Chen and Schwartz 2015, Cowan 2012). However, rather
than focusing on cost changes, we analyze the impact of changes in quality on price, which
we term as ‘quality pass-through’. In many cases, such as when the low quality product
is particularly damaging or unsafe, we show how the persuasion effect dominates such that
buyer surplus is maximized by eliminating false advertising. However, we also formalize a
set of parameter conditions where the price effect dominates. Here, the optimal penalty is
softer so as to induce a positive level of false advertising. Such cases include markets that
are otherwise ‘healthy’ - where product quality levels are relatively high or where the prob-
ability of high quality is large. For instance, consider a recent case where the manufacturer
of Nurofen was fined 6m Australian dollars (AUD) after marketing four specific painkillers
at twice the price of their normal product despite the products being effectively identical.
Although estimates suggested that this strategy yielded AUD45m, the firm was only fined
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AUD6m. However, within the case, it was recognized that the strategy did not cause any
physical harm. Hence, depending upon the exact parameters, our analysis could suggest
that such a moderate fine may have indeed been optimal.3
Next, we analyze the effects of marginal penalty changes on profits and total welfare.
Ex ante, the monopolist weakly prefers strong penalties that eradicate false advertising,
because this enables it to extract more surplus from buyers when its quality is high. Hence,
if the monopolist could commit, its choice of penalty would coincide with that preferred
by buyers in many circumstances. However, for other cases, in contrast to the view that
self-regulation is too soft, the monopolist’s preferred penalty is actually too strong relative
to buyers’ preferences. We then consider total welfare. On the one hand, false advertising
lowers credibility and so prompts any type with a high claim to further reduce its output
below the socially desirable level. On the other hand, false advertising allows the low type
to expand its output. We show that the latter dominates in otherwise ‘healthy’ markets,
such that a positive level of false advertising is again optimal.
Section 5 extends the main model to the case where product quality is endogenous. This
is important because false advertising can reduce product quality investment by limiting
the available returns from high quality products. However, while we confirm that such an
‘investment’ effect prompts weakly higher penalties, we find that a positive level of false
advertising can remain optimal for buyer and social welfare. In addition, once quality is
endogenous, we show how a penalty increase can raise the probability of false advertising.
In most of the paper we restrict attention to equilibria in which the firm signals high
quality through its report but not its price. In Section 6 we dispense with this restriction.
We first show that common equilibrium refinements have little bite in our game due to the
assumption of symmetric marginal costs. Second, to allow the refinements to have more
power, we then introduce a small asymmetry in the types’ marginal costs. A Pareto-based
criterion uniquely selects a different but related equilibrium where price signaling may arise,
and where a less rich form of our results and intuition still remains.
Finally, Section 7 shows how the results of the main model are robust to i) an arbitrary
number of quality types, and ii) an alternative, multiplicative form of utility.
Background and Related Literature: In the US, most federal-level false advertising regulation
is conducted by the FTC with various public measures, including monetary penalties. The
FTC Deception Policy Statement defines a practice as deceptive if it is likely to mislead-
ingly influence a reasonable consumer.4 In Europe, most countries employ varying levels of
industry self-regulation alongside statutory regulations under the EU Directive on Unfair
3See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-38337217. Accessed 10/23/17.
4For all policy documents listed in this paragraph see goo.gl/jL5Hrd, goo.gl/XBMkhL, and
goo.gl/rVJ4F8. Accessed 10/23/17.
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Commercial Practices. For instance, in the UK, most initial regulation is conducted by the
industry-led Advertising Standards Authority, which is endorsed by various governmental
bodies with the power to issue fines and bring criminal proceedings. Under the Directive, a
practice is regarded as misleading if it is likely to deceive the average consumer and prompt
them to make a transaction they would not otherwise make. Thus, like many other coun-
tries, the regulation of false advertising in the US and EU focuses only on the potential
for consumer harm (under what we term as the ‘persuasion’ effect) and makes no account
for any possible countervailing benefits (as consistent with our ‘price’ effect). This stance
contrasts to that held by the FTC in relation to unfair practices, where a practice is deemed
unfair if it causes a substantial injury to consumers that is not outweighed by any offsetting
benefits to consumers or competition. Our paper suggests that this more balanced stance
may also be sensible when regulating false advertising.
Within the advertising literature, attention is typically focused on truthful advertising
(e.g. Anderson and Renault 2006, Johnson and Myatt 2006, and the reviews by Bagwell
2007, and Renault 2015). However, false advertising was discussed in some early work. For
instance, contrary to our paper, Beales et al (1981, p.532) assert that “Because literally false
statements offer no benefits to consumers, there is no reason to allow them”. In other early
work, Nelson (1974) provides a seminal discussion about the credibility of false advertising,
noting “Deception requires not only a misleading or untrue statement, but somebody ready
to be misled by the statement” (p.749). He then suggests that moderate regulation of false
advertising may actually provide it with a source of credibility and enhance the incentives
for firms to use it.
Since then, false advertising and its regulation are only beginning to be understood
more formally in a small, recent literature. Some papers assume that buyers are naive
and so believe all claims (e.g. Glaeser and Ujhelyi 2010, Hattori and Higashida 2012).
Here, false advertising raises firms’ profits, lowers consumer surplus, and can increase total
welfare by offsetting the output distortion from imperfect competition. Other papers seek to
endogenize advertising credibility with rational buyers. For example, some papers introduce
heterogeneous tastes so that claims can gain credibility by forfeiting revenues from some
buyers (e.g. Chakraborty and Harbaugh 2014). Another set of papers examine legal penalties
in ways more related to our paper. Corts (2013, 2014a, 2014b) considers a setting where
a monopolist knows its type but finds it costly to learn its precise product quality. Total
welfare is assumed to be increasing in the fineness of consumer information. For low learning
costs, total welfare is maximized with high penalties that induce the firm to learn its quality
and eradicate false advertising. However when learning costs are higher, such that the
firm chooses not to know its quality, lower penalties can raise welfare by inducing the firm
to use speculative quality claims to signal its type even when such claims are false with
positive probability. Under a different mechanism, Piccolo et al (2015) demonstrate that false
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advertising can maximize buyer surplus in a duopoly where the firms have different product
qualities. They show that it is always optimal to use zero ‘laissez-faire’ penalties to induce
full pooling rather than full separation. Intuitively, this creates a downward competitive
pressure on prices by making the firms appear undifferentiated. However, after studying a
monopoly version of their model, the authors suggest that this result can only arise in a
competitive context.5
Our research differs from such work in a number of important respects. Firstly, we analyze
a richer class of semi-pooling equilibria. Unlike the full pooling and separating equilibria in
past models, these equilibria allow for false claims to arise in equilibrium, and to inflate
buyers’ beliefs beyond their priors. Secondly, by using a more general form of demand, we
highlight a novel role for demand curvature. This enables us to provide precise conditions for
when false advertising is beneficial, and to show how the optimal penalty varies intuitively
with demand and market parameters. Thirdly, we show that competition is not necessary
for false advertising to maximize buyer surplus. Moreover, we provide a unified set of results
for buyer surplus, total welfare and firm profits.
Finally, our paper is related to some broader areas. First, aside from false quality claims,
as considered in this article, other work is also beginning to understand alternative forms of
false advertising, such as deceptive price claims. For instance, Armstrong and Chen (2017)
examine firms’ incentives to exaggerate their reported initial price when making price dis-
counts, and show that a move from zero to full regulation need not improve welfare. More
broadly, our article adds to the growing literature on consumer protection policy which also
considers wider topics, such as high-pressure sales tactics (Armstrong and Zhou 2016) and
refund rights (Inderst and Ottaviani 2013). Second, our model relates to some recent work on
equilibrium lying and persuasion under full rationality (e.g. Kartik 2009, and Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2011). In contrast, we study policy-related lying costs within a specific advertising
context, where a third-party influences not only the amount of information that is commu-
nicated to buyers but also indirectly the price that they pay. Third, our article is related
to the literatures on price signaling and quality disclosure (see Bagwell 2007 and Dranove
and Jin 2010 for respective reviews). These literatures note that welfare can be maximized
by some form of pooling due to either i) the output distortions from price signaling under
separation, or ii) positive costs of disclosure. Instead, our results provide clear conditions
under which (partial) pooling can be buyer- or welfare-optimal even when truthful disclosure
is costless, and when full separation does not involve output distortions.
5In more distant work, Daughety and Reinganum (1997) study how punitive damages for false safety
claims can help support separating equilibria when firms face liability losses for product defects, Barigozzi
et al (2009) examine false comparative advertising, and Drugov and Troya-Martinez (2015) analyze false
advice where firms can also choose the vagueness of their claims.
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2 Model
A monopolist sells one product to a unit mass of potential buyers. The monopolist is
privately informed about its product quality q. Specifically, the product is of low quality
L with probability x ∈ (0, 1), and of high quality H with probability 1 − x, where −∞ <
L < H < ∞. Average ex ante quality is then defined as q¯ = xL + (1 − x)H. For our main
analysis we assume that marginal costs are independent of quality and normalized to zero.
Each buyer has a unit demand and values a given product of quality q at q+ ε, where ε is a
buyer’s privately known match with the product. This match is drawn independently across
buyers using a distribution function G(ε) with support [a, b] where −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞. The
associated density g(ε) is strictly positive, continuously differentiable, and has an increasing
hazard rate.
The monopolist sends a publicly observable advertisement or ‘report’ r ∈ {L,H} at no
cost, where a report r = z is equivalent to a claim “Product quality is z”. The binary
report space is without loss because there are only two firm types and reports are costless. A
policymaker is able to verify any advertised claim and impose a penalty φ if it is false, where
false advertising is defined as the use of a high quality report r = H, by a firm with low
quality q = L.6 The policymaker can costlessly choose any level of penalty, φ ≥ 0, in order
to maximize one of three possible objectives: buyer surplus, total profit, or total welfare.
Any penalties that involve a fine go to the policymaker.
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 1 the policymaker publicly commits to
a penalty φ for false advertising. At stage 2 the monopolist privately learns its quality, q.
Given q, it then announces a price p(q) and issues a report r(q) ∈ {L,H}. At stage 3 buyers
decide whether to buy the product taking into account φ as well as the firm’s price and
report. Finally at stage 4 the policymaker verifies the advertised claim and administers the
penalty, φ, if it is false. The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). All
omitted proofs are included in the appendix unless stated otherwise.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Benchmark with Known Quality
As a first step, consider a benchmark case in which the firm is known to have quality q.
Quality claims are then redundant because it is weakly optimal for the firm to use truthful
advertising. An individual buyer purchases the product if and only if ε ≥ p − q such that
demand equals D(p − q) = 1 − G(p − q). The firm then chooses its price to maximize
6One can interpret φ as an expected penalty if claims are only verified probabilistically, in which case φ
is the product of the probability of detection and level of penalty (conditional on detection). More broadly,
φ can also include any direct costs of making a false claim.
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p [1−G (p− q)], and so:
Lemma 1. Suppose the firm is known to have quality q, and define q˜ = −b and q˜ =−a+ 1/g(a). The firm’s optimal price, p∗(q), is increasing in q and satisfies:
p∗(q) =

0 if q ≤ q˜
1−G(p∗(q)−q)
g(p∗(q)−q) if q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
a+ q if q ≥ q˜
(1)
When q ≤ q˜, quality is so low that the firm would make zero sales even if it priced atmarginal cost. The market is inactive, and we normalize the firm’s price to zero without
loss. When instead q ∈ (q˜, q˜), the firm optimally sells to some but not all buyers such thatp∗ (q) satisfies the usual first order condition. Finally if q ≥ q˜, quality is so high that the firm
optimally sells to all potential customers by pricing at the willingness-to-pay of the marginal
buyer, a+ q, such that the market is ‘covered’. However, for some distributions, q˜ =∞ and
so this final case is redundant. Henceforth to avoid some uninteresting cases, let q¯ > q˜ (orq¯ + b > 0) such that a product of average quality always has some positive value.
In our later analysis, it will be important to understand how the optimal price varies
with quality, and we will sometimes refer to the derivative p∗q(q) as ‘quality pass-through’.
To this end, it is useful to define demand curvature as σ(ψ) = −[1 − G(ψ)]g′(ψ)/g(ψ)2 i.e.
the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand (see Aguirre et al 2010 and Weyl and Fabinger
2013).7 When σ(ψ) ≤ 1− ρ demand is also said to be ρ-concave (see Anderson and Renault
2003). We now show that the level of quality pass-through, p∗q(q), depends upon the value
of q. Firstly for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), after differentiating the first order condition:
p∗q(q) =
1− σ(p∗(q)− q)
2− σ(p∗(q)− q) . (2)
Our assumption of an increasing hazard rate implies that D(p−q) is logconcave in price. This
guarantees that σ(ψ) ≤ 1 (or equivalently, that demand is 0-concave) such that p∗q(q) ∈ [0, 1) .
Intuitively, an increase in quality q produces a parallel outward shift in the inverse demand
curve, and the firm optimally responds by both charging a higher price and by selling to
strictly more buyers.8 Secondly, where appropriate, when q ≥ q˜ quality pass-through is one
since the optimal price tracks the willingness-to-pay of the lowest buyer, a+ q.
7In more detail, let Q denote output and P (Q) be the inverse demand curve. The elasticity of the slope
of inverse demand is then −QPQQ(Q)/PQ(Q). After some standard manipulations this gives D ·Dpp/(Dp)2,
which simplifies to the expression in the text.
8Weyl and Fabinger (2013) note that the optimal price change from any outward unit shift in inverse
demand (such as an increase in quality within our model) equals one minus cost pass-through.
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The equilibrium profit earned by a firm of known quality q can be written as
pi∗(q) = p∗(q) [1−G (p∗(q)− q)] , (3)
which is continuously differentiable for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜). It is straightforward to show that pi∗ (q)is globally increasing and convex in q. Finally, buyer surplus can be expressed as
v∗(q) =
ˆ b+q
p∗(q)
[1−G (z − q)] dz, (4)
which is also continuously differentiable for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜). Notice that v∗ (q) is i) strictlypositive and strictly increasing in q ∈ (q˜, q˜), and ii) (where appropriate) constant in q > q˜.We further discuss the shape of v∗(q) in Section 4.1 below.
3.2 Privately-Known Quality
Henceforth we assume that the firm is privately informed about its quality. As is typical
in signaling games, there exists a large number of PBE because buyers can attribute any
off-path claim or price to the low type. We therefore proceed by considering PBE under two
restrictions.
Restriction 1: The high type makes a truthful claim with probability one, r(H) = H.
This allows us to focus on settings with the potential for meaningful false advertising by
the low type. Further, notice that for given beliefs, the use of a high report is costless for
the high type, but costly for the low type whenever φ > 0. Therefore intuitively one would
expect the high type to use a high report to signal its quality. See Daughety and Reinganum
(1997) for a similar argument.
If the low type makes a false claim r(L) = H, it must charge the same price as the high
type otherwise buyers would correctly infer its type. Therefore, we need to determine the
price charged by the firm when it reports r = H. As we later explain, many such prices can
form a PBE even after applying standard refinements due to the assumption of symmetric
marginal costs. Hence, to select amongst these prices we impose a second restriction:
Restriction 2: On observing r = H, buyer beliefs are independent of prices.
Conditional on reporting r = H and charging any price p, the high type earns exactly
φ more than the low type because they both have the same marginal cost of production.
Therefore the types’ payoffs are not single-crossing in price, and so any attempt by the high
type to signal its quality through price can be mimicked at exactly the same cost by the
low type. As a result, the high type cannot profit from price signaling and so Restriction 2
suggests it is reasonable that buyers should not make additional inferences from the firm’s
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price beyond those implied by the high report. See Corts (2013) for a related argument, and
also Section 6 where the restriction is further discussed.9
To see the implications of Restriction 2, let qeH ≡ E (q|r = H) denote buyers’ beliefs
following a high report. An individual buyer purchases the product if and only if ε ≥ p− qeH ,
such that the firm’s profit (before any penalties) is p[1 − G(p − qeH)], and so it optimally
charges p∗(qeH).
We now show that Restrictions 1 and 2 lead to a unique equilibrium with some attractive
economic properties and analytical features.
Proposition 1. Under Restrictions 1 and 2 there exists a unique PBE10 in which:
i) A high type claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH).
ii) A low type randomizes. With probability y∗ it claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH). With
probability 1− y∗ it claims r = L and charges p∗(L).
- When φ ≤ φ1 ≡ pi∗(q¯)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 1
- When φ ≥ φ0 ≡ pi∗(H)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 0
- When φ ∈ (φ1, φ0), y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and uniquely solves
pi∗(qeH)− φ = pi∗(L), (5)
where qeH =
xy∗L+ (1− x)H
1− x+ xy∗ . (6)
iii) Buyer beliefs are Pr (q = H|r = L) = 0 and Pr (q = H|r = H) = 1−x
1−x+xy∗ .
The exact nature of the equilibrium depends intuitively and smoothly on whether the
penalty is ‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’. Firstly, if φ ≥ φ0 the equilibrium has full separation,
with both types reporting truthfully because the penalty is sufficiently high that truth-telling
is a dominant strategy for the low type. Advertising is perfectly informative and claims are
fully believed by buyers. Consequently, each type q ∈ {L,H} sets its full information price
p∗(q), and earns its full information profit pi∗(q). Secondly, if φ ≤ φ1 the equilibrium has full
pooling, with both types sending a high report because the penalty is sufficiently low that
false advertising is a dominant strategy for the low type. Upon seeing a high claim buyers
then maintain their prior belief that the firm’s average quality is q¯. As such, both types set
9An alternative model-based justification for Restriction 2 is as follows. In practice, the claim and pricing
decisions may be taken by different divisions or managers within the firm. In particular, suppose at stage
2 of the game one division selects the report and then decides whether to inform the price-setter of the
actual quality for some positive (but potentially small) communication cost. The (otherwise uninformed)
price-setter then chooses a price. Informing the price-setter is a dominated strategy because once the report
is made the payoffs of the two types are identical and so the optimal price does not depend on q. Therefore,
in equilibrium, the price-setter remains uninformed. Moreover, to the extent that buyers do not put weight
on strictly dominated strategies, they should believe that the price-setter is uninformed, and so should not
use price to make additional inferences about quality.
10The equilibrium is unique up to off-path beliefs. Following an off-path report r = L and price, there can
be many beliefs which are consistent with our restrictions and which generate the same equilibrium outcome.
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p∗(q¯) and earn profits of pi∗(q¯) and pi∗(q¯)− φ respectively. Finally and most interestingly, if
φ ∈ (φ1, φ0) the equilibrium is semi-pooling. Here the low type randomizes, making a false
report with probability y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and a truthful report with complementary probability
1 − y∗. Upon seeing a high report buyers therefore update their belief about quality to
qeH ≡ E(q|r = H) ∈ (q¯, H) as expressed in (6). Consequently the high type reports r = H
and charges p∗(qeH), and the low type randomizes between r = L and price p
∗(L), and report
r = H and price p∗(qeH). The probability with which the low type lies, y
∗, satisfies equation
(5) and ensures that the payoffs from false advertising and truth-telling are equal. If instead
the low type lied with a probability above (below) y∗, buyers’ expected quality qeH would be
too low (high) and hence the low type would have a strict preference to report truthfully
(falsely), yielding a contradiction. Hence randomization with probability y∗ is an essential
feature of this equilibrium.
Notice that false advertising exists whenever φ < φ0. However, for very low penalties,
φ ≤ φ1, buyers effectively ignore high claims and simply maintain their prior belief within
the pooling equilibrium. On the other hand, when φ ∈ (φ1, φ0) , the semi-pooling equilibrium
has the more appealing feature that high claims provide buyers with some useful information,
and thus induce them to positively update their belief, with qeH > q¯, even if the high claim
turns out to be false.
4 The Effects of Policy
First consider the effects of policy on the level of false advertising, y∗. By using equations
(5) and (6) it follows that:
Lemma 2. The level of false advertising y∗, is continuous and weakly decreasing in the level
of penalty φ.
This feature of the model is useful analytically in the subsequent sections, and ensures
that stronger policy smoothly increases the informativeness of advertising. When φ > φ0
or φ < φ1, a low quality firm has a strict preference for truth-telling or lying respectively,
and so small changes in φ have no effect. However when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0], the probability of false
advertising y∗ satisfies the indifference condition (5) and is strictly decreasing in φ from 1
to 0. Intuitively, to maintain indifference of the low type as φ increases, high reports must
become more credible. Since buyers are Bayesian, this is only possible if y∗ is strictly lower.
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4.1 Buyer Surplus
We now consider the effects of policy on a variety of welfare measures, starting with buyer
surplus. Using Proposition 1 we can write expected buyer surplus as
E(v) = x(1− y∗)
ˆ b
p∗(L)−L
(L+ ε− p∗(L)) dG(ε) + xy∗
ˆ b
p∗(qeH)−qeH
(L+ ε− p∗(qeH)) dG(ε)
+(1− x)
ˆ b
p∗(qeH)−qeH
(H + ε− p∗(qeH)) dG(ε). (7)
In words, with probability x(1− y∗) the firm sends a low report and charges p∗(L). Buyers
correctly infer low quality, buy if ε ≥ p∗(L) − L, and receive L + ε − p∗(L). Then with
probability 1 − x + xy∗ the firm sends a high report and charges p∗(qeH). Buyers update
their beliefs according to equation (6), and buy if ε ≥ p∗(qeH) − qeH . With conditional
probability xy∗/ (1− x+ xy∗), the product is low quality, and buyers receive L+ ε−p∗(qeH).
With conditional probability (1− x)/ (1− x+ xy∗), the product is high quality, and buyers
receive H + ε− p∗(qeH). After collecting terms and using the definition of v∗(q) in equation
(4), the above expression simplifies as follows, where E(v) is just a convex combination of
v∗(L) and v∗(qeH).
E(v) = x(1− y∗)v∗(L) + (xy∗ + 1− x)v∗(qeH). (8)
We now exploit the smooth feature of our equilibrium to investigate the effect of a
marginal increase in the penalty φ. In particular Lemma 3 will provide conditions under
which an increase in the penalty φ leads to a reduction in expected buyer surplus. To
understand why this can happen, recall that the level of false advertising y∗ is a decreasing
function of φ, and note that an increase in y∗ produces two effects. On the one hand, buyers
are more likely to receive a false advert and so be persuaded to buy a low quality product at
an inflated price p∗(qeH) > p
∗(L). However on the other hand, the increase in lying damages
the credibility of high quality claims, and forces any type making such a claim to reduce its
price. In more detail, using equation (8) one can write
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x [v∗ (qeH)− (qeH − L)D (p∗(qeH)− qeH)− v∗(L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘Persuasion’ effect
− (1− x+ xy∗)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH) · p∗q(qeH) ·
∂qeH
∂y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘Price’ effect
. (9)
The first term is a ‘persuasion’ effect. Conditional on the firm having low quality, a
marginal increase in lying replaces the surplus that the buyer would have received if the
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firm had told the truth, v∗(L), with the surplus associated with false advertising, v∗ (qeH)−
(qeH − L)D (p∗(qeH)− qeH). To explain this latter surplus, note that after observing a high
report, buyers update their beliefs to qeH , and expect to receive a surplus v
∗ (qeH). However
since quality is low, each of the D (p∗(qeH)− qeH) units bought is worth qeH − L less than
anticipated. This harms buyers by prompting them to pay too much and to potentially
buy too many units of a low quality product. The second term in (9) is a ‘price’ effect. A
marginal increase in lying decreases the probability that a high claim is true, and so causes
rational buyers to revise their belief qeH downwards. This lowers the level of monopoly power
and induces any type with a high report to reduce its price by −p∗q(qeH) · (∂qeH/∂y∗). Hence
conditional on the firm sending a high report, buyer surplus is strictly higher on each of the
D(p∗(qeH) − qeH) inframarginal units bought. Importantly for our later results, this effect is
more powerful when quality pass-through p∗q(q
e
H) is larger.
To establish whether the persuasion effect or the price effect dominates, it is useful to
simplify equation (9) in the following way
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x
[
v∗ (qeH)− v∗(L)− (qeH − L) v∗q (qeH)
]
. (10)
It is then clear that the shape of v∗(q) determines whether expected buyer surplus is increas-
ing or decreasing in y∗. Intuitively, a small increase in y∗ leads to posterior beliefs which
have the same mean but put more weight closer to the prior. Using Jensen’s inequality the
impact of this on expected buyer welfare depends on whether v∗(q) is convex or concave. To
proceed further we impose a regularity condition on v∗(q). In particular, while our earlier
restriction σ(ψ) ≤ 1 ensures that v∗(q) is monotonically increasing, Condition 1 now ensures
that v∗(q) is s-shaped:
Condition 1. There exists a threshold qˆv ∈ (q˜,∞) such that v∗(q) is strictly convex for q ∈(q˜, qˆv). For q > qˆv either i) v∗q (q) = 0, or ii) v∗(q) is strictly concave with limq→∞ v∗q (q) = 0.
Condition 1 is satisfied by many common demand functions. Full details are provided in
Section A of the Supplementary Appendix.11 There we show that Condition 1 imposes a
restriction on the slope of demand curvature and how it varies with quality. As such, it
ensures that quality pass-through is relatively low when qeH is small, but is relatively high
when qeH is large.
In more detail, Condition 1i is satisfied by any demand with constant curvature, a rich
class which includes linear and exponential demand (see Bulow and Pfleiderer 1983). Here,
qˆv = q˜ < ∞. Intuitively, when q < q˜ small increases in q raise the surplus of inframarginal
11This appendix may also prove useful for other wider literatures. For instance, a recent literature on third-
degree price discrimination uses a related restriction to ensure that buyer surplus is convex with respect to
marginal cost (e.g. Chen and Schwartz 2015 and Cowan 2012).
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buyers by a constant amount 1−p∗q(q) > 0, but also induce more and more buyers to purchase,
and hence v∗(q) is strictly convex. However once q > q˜ the market is covered and quality pass-
through is one, p∗q(q) = 1, and so any further increases in q leave v
∗(q) unchanged. Condition
1ii is satisfied by many demands with increasing curvature - including those derived from
the Normal, Weibull, Power, Type I Extreme Value, and Logistic distributions. Here, v∗(q)
is strictly increasing for all q > q˜, implying that the market never becomes covered, q˜ =∞.Intuitively, when q < qˆv, quality pass-through is low and few buyers purchase: small increases
in q mainly increase demand and so generate a convex v∗(q). On the other hand when q > qˆv,
quality pass-through is high and most buyers purchase: small increases in q mainly increase
the surplus of inframarginal buyers, but by less and less because quality pass-through is
increasing, and so this generates a concave v∗(q).12 We can then state:
Lemma 3. Consider φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] and suppose that Condition 1 holds.
i) If L < qˆv expected buyer surplus is quasiconcave in φ. In particular there exists a threshold
q∗(L) ≥ qˆv such that expected buyer surplus is strictly increasing in φ if qeH < q∗(L), but
strictly decreasing in φ if qeH > q
∗(L). The threshold q∗(L) is weakly decreasing in L and
satisfies limL→qˆv q
∗(L) = qˆv.
ii) If L > qˆv expected buyer surplus is weakly decreasing in φ.
Lemma 3 can be understood as follows. First consider L < qˆv. When q
e
H < q
∗(L) buyers
are relatively pessimistic upon seeing a high report, quality pass-through is relatively weak,
and so the persuasion effect dominates. When instead qeH > q
∗(L) buyers are relatively
optimistic upon seeing a high report, quality pass-through is relatively strong, and so the
price effect dominates. Hence a stronger policy benefits buyers in the former situation, but
harms them in the latter. Second consider L > qˆv. If demand satisfies Condition 1i, the
price and persuasion effects cancel such that ∂E(v)/∂φ = 0. Intuitively the market is fully
covered irrespective of the firm’s claim, and buyers pay either a + L under a low claim, or
a + qeH under a high claim. The average price paid is therefore a + q¯ which is independent
of φ. However if instead demand satisfies Condition 1ii, the price effect strictly dominates
such that ∂E(v)/∂φ < 0.
We now consider the optimal level of penalty, φ∗. To ease exposition, we henceforth focus
on the (more interesting) case where L < qˆv. Recalling Lemma 3, we find that:
12Condition 1 is satisfied by all the closed-form, continuously differentiable, logconcave demands listed in
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). One interesting exception is homogeneous buyers, under which v∗(q) = 0
for all q, such that expected buyer surplus is independent of φ. Another exception is demand derived from
the Laplace distribution. Here there is a threshold q0 such that v
∗(q) is strictly convex for q < q0, kinks
downwards at q = q0, but behaves like Condition 1ii for q > q0. Numerical examples show that when
L < q0 < H expected buyer surplus is not necessarily quasiconcave in y
∗.
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Proposition 2. Fix L < qˆv and suppose that Condition 1 holds. The buyer-optimal penalty,
φ∗, is characterized as follows:
i) When H ≤ q∗(L), φ∗ ≥ φ0 such that y∗ = 0 .
ii) When q¯ < q∗(L) < H, φ∗ = pi∗(q∗(L)) − pi∗ (L) such that y∗ = (H−q∗(L))(1−x)
(H−q∗(L))(1−x)+q∗(L)−q¯ ∈
(0, 1).
iii) When q∗(L) ≤ q¯, φ∗ ≤ φ1 such that y∗ = 1.
Proposition 2 provides a range of demand and parameter conditions where a buyer-
oriented policymaker refrains from eradicating false advertising. Recall from Lemma 3 that
for L < qˆv, a marginal decrease in false advertising increases buyer surplus if and only if
buyers are relatively pessimistic about high claims, with qeH < q
∗(L). Therefore when H ≤
q∗(L) buyer surplus is globally decreasing in y∗ and the policymaker optimally eliminates
false advertising. However when q¯ < q∗(L) < H buyer surplus is strictly quasiconcave and
maximized at some y∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that the optimal penalty tolerates some false advertising.
Finally when q∗(L) ≤ q¯ buyer surplus is globally increasing in y∗ and so the policymaker
fully permits false advertising.
The fact that a positive level of false advertising can generate a higher buyer surplus than
under full information (where y∗ = 0) gives several policy implications. First, any instinctive
per se implementation of strong penalties or blanket prohibitions on false advertising may
actually limit buyer surplus. Second, the optimal use of advertising penalties is superior
to an outright ban on low quality products. Such a ban only generates a surplus E(v) =
(1− x)v∗(H), which is weakly less than the surplus under full information.
Finally, we further detail the conditions under which positive false advertising is optimal.
Corollary 1. Given Condition 1 and L < qˆv, the buyer-optimal level of false advertising,
y∗, is increasing in the product quality levels, L and H, and the (ex ante) probability that
quality is high, (1− x).
Intuitively, when the monopolist’s product quality technology is relatively ‘healthy’, the
expected quality from a high claim, qeH , is relatively high such that the price effect becomes
relatively more powerful. On the contrary, in less ‘healthy’ settings, the persuasion effect
becomes especially harmful. Figure 1 illustrates these results in the simple case where buyer
match values are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and low quality is normalized such that
L = 0. The figure plots the buyer-optimal y∗ as a function of H, for three different values
of (1 − x). In this example q∗(L) = 1, and hence for H < 1 it is optimal to use a tough
policy to eliminate false advertising. However for H > 1 some false advertising is optimal,
and consistent with Corollary 1 the optimal y∗ is an increasing function of both H and
(1 − x). To see the magnitude of these policy effects, consider a more specific example in
which x = 1/2 and H = 3/2, where the buyer-optimal policy induces y∗ = 1/2. Here,
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expected buyer surplus is 30% higher than it would be under a high penalty where y∗ = 0,
and approximately 6% higher than it would be under a low penalty where y∗ = 1.
Figure 1: The Buyer-Optimal Level of False Advertising for Example Parameters
Figure 1 plots the buyer-optimal level of false advertising, y∗, as a function of H, for the case
where G(ε) = ε on [0, 1], L = 0, and (1−x) equals either 3/5 (the solid line), 1/2 (the dashed line),
or 2/5 (the dotted line).
4.2 Profits
We now examine the effect of policy on profits. To begin, consider each individual firm type:
E (piL) =
pi∗(q¯)− φ if φ < φ1pi∗ (L) if φ ≥ φ1 and E (piH) =

pi∗(q¯) if φ < φ1
pi∗ (L) + φ if φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]
pi∗(H) if φ > φ0
(11)
This is explained as follows. When φ < φ1 the equilibrium has full pooling such that each
type earns pi∗(q¯), but the low type also incurs a penalty φ. When φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] the low type is
indifferent between lying and truth-telling, and so earns pi∗(L). The high type, meanwhile,
earns pi∗(qeH) which is equal to pi
∗(L) + φ from (5). Finally when φ > φ0 the equilibrium has
full separation, and so each type earns its full information payoff.
Remark 1. An increase in φ reduces E (piL), but increases E (piH).
Intuitively, stronger regulation increases the high type’s payoff because it leads buyers to
update more optimistically upon seeing a high claim. However tougher regulation hurts a low
type because it becomes costlier to mimic a high type. Now consider expected equilibrium
profit, E (Π) = xE (piL) + (1− x)E (piH):
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Proposition 3. Expected profit is quasiconvex in φ and minimized at φ = φ1. In addition:
i) If L < q˜, expected profit is maximized by φ∗ ≥ φ0.
ii) If L ≥ q˜, expected profit is maximized by either φ∗ = 0 or φ∗ ≥ φ0.
A small increase in regulation can either benefit or harm the monopolist, depending upon
how existing regulation φ compares with φ1. In addition, it is straightforward to see from
(11) that φ ∈ (0, φ0) is strictly dominated under an expected profit objective. This implies
that a positive penalty should never be paid in equilibrium. Then, given the convexity of
pi∗(q), full separation with φ∗ ≥ φ0 is always weakly optimal. Intuitively, strong regulation
allows the firm to extract buyer surplus more effectively when it has high quality. Hence, if
the monopolist could credibly commit to effective self-regulation (perhaps through a third
party), it would weakly prefer to avoid using false advertising. In some circumstances, such
as when L < qˆv and H < q
∗(L), this self-regulation might be acceptable to buyers because
the monopolist’s preferred level of penalty coincides with that of the buyers. This may offer
some support for Europe’s industry-led regulation. However, in other circumstances self-
regulation would go against buyers’ preferences e.g. when L < qˆv and H > q
∗(L). Here,
contrary to any concerns that self-regulation may be too lax, the monopolist’s preferred level
of penalty is strictly higher than buyers’.
4.3 Total Welfare
We now consider total welfare. Suppose that the penalty, φ, is in the form of a fine which
is as valuable to the policymaker as it is to the firm. Using Proposition 1, we can write
expected total welfare as follows.
E(w) = x (1− y∗) [v∗ (L) + pi∗ (L)] + (1− x+ xy∗) [v∗ (qeH) + pi∗ (qeH)] . (12)
Notice that this expression is not just the summation of expected buyer surplus in (8), and
weighted firm-type profits in (11), because by assumption the penalty has social value.
We will shortly provide conditions under which a stronger penalty φ reduces expected
total welfare. We start with some intuition and then formally state the result. The firm uses
its monopoly power to restrict output below the socially efficient level. A marginal increase
in the level of false advertising y∗ then changes this output distortion in two ways. First, it
lowers the credibility of any high claim, and so forces any type with such a claim to further
reduce its output below the socially optimal level. Second however, it also induces buyers
to over-estimate a low type’s quality, thereby causing the low type to increase its output.
Under certain circumstances this latter output expansion can raise welfare and dominate the
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former effect.13 In more detail:
∂E(w)
∂y∗
= x
[
v∗ (qeH)− v∗ (L)− (qeH − L)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH) + pi∗(qeH)− pi∗ (L)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output expansion by a firm with q = L
+ (1− x+ xy)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH)
(
1− p∗q(qeH)
)
∂qeH
∂y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output contraction by a firm with r = H
(13)
The first term in (13) represents the change in welfare when a low type moves from reporting
r = L and generating a total surplus of v∗ (L) + pi∗ (L), to claiming r = H and generating
a surplus of v∗ (qeH) − (qeH − L)D(p∗(qeH) − qeH) + pi∗ (qeH). This term is positive if and only
if L is above a certain threshold. Intuitively, the low type’s socially optimal output level
D(−L) is increasing in L. Moreover when a low type engages in false advertising, its output
increases from D (p∗(L)− L) ≤ D(−L) to D(p∗(qeH)−qeH). Therefore if L is relatively small,
this ‘output expansion’ effect goes far beyond the efficient level and so is bad for welfare.
However if L is relatively large, the output expansion effect brings the low type closer to the
efficient level, and so is good for welfare. The second term in (13) represents the change in
surplus generated by a firm that claims to have high quality, following a small increase in y∗.
As explained above, this is unambiguously negative because an increase in y∗ reduces the
credibility (and hence output) of a firm that reports r = H. Important for our later results,
this ‘output contraction’ effect tends to be smaller when quality pass-through p∗q(q
e
H) is larger
since in that case the firm’s output is less sensitive to buyers’ belief about its quality.
To determine which of these two output effects dominates, it is useful to define w∗(q) ≡
v∗(q) + pi∗(q), and simplify (13) as follows
∂E(w)
∂y∗
= x
[
w∗ (qeH)− w∗(L)− (qeH − L)w∗q (qeH)
]
. (14)
There is a clear parallel with our earlier buyer surplus analysis. In particular by Jensen’s
inequality, the shape of w∗(q) determines how an increase in y∗ changes expected welfare.
Therefore to proceed further, we impose an additional regularity condition:
Condition 2. There exists a threshold qˆw ∈ (q˜,∞) such that w∗(q) is strictly convex forq ∈ (q˜, qˆw). For q > qˆw either i) w∗q(q) = 1 with limq↑qˆw w∗q(q) > 1, or ii) w∗(q) is strictlyconcave with limq→∞w∗q(q) = 1.
This imposes a further restriction on the slope of demand curvature and how it varies
with quality. While it differs from Condition 1, it plays a qualitatively similar role to
13The output distortions on the two types’ output are reminiscent of the output effects in third-degree
price discrimination (e.g. Aguirre et al 2010).
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ensure that w∗(q) is s-shaped. In particular it ensures that when qeH is small, quality pass-
through is relatively low such that the output contraction effect is powerful, and that when
qeH is large the opposite is true. Similar to earlier, part i) deals with situations where
qˆw = q˜ < ∞ such that the market can become covered, whilst part ii) deals with cases
where q˜ = ∞ such that the market is never fully covered. As detailed in Section A of the
Supplementary Appendix, Condition 2 holds for all demands with constant curvature, and
several others with increasing curvature including those derived from the Normal, Weibull
and Power distributions.14 Therefore, we can state:
Lemma 4. Consider φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] and suppose that Condition 2 holds.
i) When qeH < qˆw expected total welfare is strictly increasing in φ.
ii) When L < qˆw < q
e
H expected total welfare is quasiconcave in φ. In particular there
exists a threshold L∗(qeH) < qˆw such that expected total welfare is strictly increasing in φ if
L < L∗(qeH), but strictly decreasing in φ if L > L
∗(qeH). The threshold L
∗(qeH) is weakly
decreasing in qeH .
iii) When L > qˆw expected total welfare is weakly decreasing in φ.
Lemma 4 can be understood as follows. When qeH < qˆw quality pass-through is relatively
small, such that the output contraction effect dominates, and so E(w) decreases in the level
of false advertising y∗. When L < qˆw < qeH quality pass-through is relatively stronger, and
so the output contraction effect is weaker. A small increase in y∗ therefore raises welfare
provided L is sufficiently large, such that the expansion in the low type’s output is not (too)
excessive. Finally when L is large with L > qˆw, an increase in the penalty can never raise
welfare as the output expansion always weakly dominates.
In a model with one firm type and naive buyers, Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) show that
some false advertising always improves total welfare by increasing output towards the social
optimum. Our welfare result with two types and rational buyers is more complex for the
following reasons. First in our model, when the low type pools with the high type it increases
its output to D(p∗(qeH)− qeH), which may actually exceed the socially optimal level. Second
in our model, false advertising reduces the credibility of high claims and so generates another
welfare-reducing ‘output contraction’ effect which is not present in their paper.
Now consider the implications for the optimal penalty. To ease exposition, we focus on
the (more interesting) case where L < qˆw. First, note that the policymaker will always
eliminate false advertising with φ∗ ≥ φ0 when H < qˆw. This follows from Lemma 4 because
qeH < qˆw for all y
∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Second, for the remaining cases, the policymaker is assumed to
choose the lowest level of false advertising if indifferent. Proposition 4 then confirms that it
14Some other common distributions with increasing curvature do not satisfy Condition 2, such as the
Logistic and Type I Extreme Value (Min). Here w∗(q) is globally strictly convex, such that E(w) is maximized
by y∗ = 0. Also, following from footnote 12, E(w) is always weakly decreasing in y∗ with homogeneous
buyers, and E(w) is not necessarily quasiconcave in y∗ under the Laplace distribution.
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can remain optimal to induce a positive level of false advertising:
Proposition 4. Fix L < qˆw < H and suppose that Condition 2 holds. The welfare-optimal
penalty, φ∗, is characterized as follows:
i) When L ≤ L∗(H), φ∗ ≥ φ0 such that y∗ = 0.
ii) When L > L∗(H), φ∗ < φ0 such that y∗ ∈ (0, 1].
Hence, even though full separation with φ∗ ≥ φ0 involves full information prices and no
output distortions, it may still be optimal to induce false advertising to prompt some form
of pooling. In line with intuition, one can show that the optimal level of false advertising is
weakly lower than that under a buyer surplus objective. However, the optimal level of false
advertising remains increasing in the ‘healthiness’ of the market (e.g. L, H, and (1− x)).15
5 Endogenous Quality Investment
We now extend the main model to examine some additional effects of false advertising in a
market with endogenous product quality. Such effects have been largely ignored within the
literature. However they are important because the existence of false advertising may reduce
the incentives to invest in product quality by limiting the credibility of advertising. Suppose
that the firm is initially endowed with low quality L, but can upgrade to high quality H
by paying an investment cost C. This cost is drawn privately from a distribution F (C) on
(0,∞), with corresponding density f(C) > 0. The move order is then as follows. At stage
1 the policymaker commits to a penalty φ. At stage 2 the firm learns its investment cost
C, and privately chooses whether to upgrade. It also announces its report and price. The
game then proceeds as in the main model, with buyers making their purchase decisions,
and the policymaker instigating any potential penalties. Let x∗(φ) denote the endogenous
probability that the firm has low quality.
There always exists a trivial equilibrium in which x∗(φ) = 1. If buyers believe that prod-
uct quality is low for all reports and prices, the firm has no incentive to invest. However,
in general, there also exist other alternative PBE. Henceforth, as before, we impose Restric-
tions 1 and 2. Moreover whenever possible, we focus on equilibria where the firm invests
with positive probability.
Lemma 5. i) When φ = 0 all equilibria have x∗(φ) = 1. ii) When φ ∈ (0, φ0] there is a
unique equilibrium (up to off-path beliefs) satisfying our restrictions, with x∗ = 1 − F (φ) ∈
(0, 1).
15Finally, false advertising can remain optimal even when a fraction τ of the penalty is ‘lost’ and does not
contribute to total welfare. For instance when L∗(q¯) < L < qˆw ≤ q¯ the optimal penalty induces y∗ = 1 for
all τ ∈ [0, 1]. The only difference is that when τ = 0 any φ ∈ [0, φ1] maximizes total welfare, whereas when
τ > 0 it is more attractive to reduce the penalties incurred, so φ∗ = 0 is the unique optimum.
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Intuitively, an increase in φ induces investment by widening the gap in profits earned by
high and low quality firms. In more detail, when φ = 0 buyers cannot distinguish between
high and low quality. The firm earns the same profit regardless and therefore chooses not
to invest. Alternatively when φ ≥ φ0, claims are fully credible. A low quality firm reports
r = L and earns pi∗(L), whilst a high quality firm reports r = H and earns pi∗(H). Since the
gains from investing are pi∗(H)−pi∗(L) ≡ φ0, the firm upgrades if and only if C ≤ φ0. Finally
when φ ∈ (0, φ0), the level of false advertising is necessarily positive for the same reason as
in the main model. This further implies that a high quality product earns φ more than a low
quality product such that the firm invests with probability F (φ). However unlike the main
model, the probability of false advertising y∗ is not necessarily decreasing everywhere in φ.
Recall the definition qeH ≡ E(q|r = H). Intuitively, an increase in φ can enhance advertising
credibility and cause investment to increase by so much that, ceteris paribus, the net gains
from false advertising, pi∗(qeH) − φ, actually rise, and prompt a higher y∗. In his seminal
discussion, Nelson (1974) suggested that advertising policy may increase the credibility of
false advertising. Here, we formalize an even stronger relationship - policy can provide so
much credibility that parameters exist where the probability of false advertising is increasing
in the level of penalty. Nevertheless, despite any potential increase in y∗, stronger penalties
still always induce a larger expected quality, qeH . Now consider the optimal penalty:
Proposition 5. Suppose Condition 1 holds and that L < qˆv. A buyer-orientated policymaker
i) always sets φ > 0, and ii) sets φ < φ0 such that y
∗ > 0 provided H > q∗(L) and
f(φ0)/F (φ0) is sufficiently small.
To understand this result, rewrite (8) from earlier using x ≡ x∗(φ) as
E(v) = v∗(L) + (H − L)v
∗(qeH)− v∗(L)
qeH − L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price/Persuasion terms
× (1− x∗(φ)) .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment term
(15)
The second term captures the trade-off between the price and persuasion effects. As in the
main model, Condition 1 ensures that this term is increasing in φ if and only if qeH < q
∗(L).
The third term relates to a new ‘investment’ effect. A high quality product generates more
buyer surplus than a low quality product. Therefore ceteris paribus, an increase in φ is
beneficial since it prompts a higher level of investment. Proposition 5 is then explained as
follows. Firstly, unlike in the main model, φ = 0 is never optimal because the firm then never
invests and so buyers get only v∗(L). Alternatively, for any φ > 0, the firm invests with
positive probability and so from (15) buyer surplus strictly exceeds v∗(L). Secondly though,
despite this new investment effect, policy may still refrain from completely eliminating false
advertising. In particular, this is the case when H > q∗(L) and f(φ0)/F (φ0) is relatively
small. Intuitively the latter restriction on f(C) implies that starting from strong regulation,
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φ = φ0, a small decrease in φ only has a small effect on the investment probability, such that
the combined price and persuasion effects dominate. Consequently, as in the main model,
false advertising can sometimes benefit buyers.16
Finally, one can compare the optimal penalty with that under exogenous quality. In par-
ticular, let φ∗en denote the optimal penalty with endogenous quality, and impose a technical
condition f(φ)(H − L) < 1 to ensure it is unique. Then, to make a comparison, let x∗ (φ∗en)
be the proportion of low types under exogenous quality, and denote the associated optimal
penalty by φ∗ex. One can then prove that φ
∗
ex ≤ φ∗en, such that the optimal penalty is stronger
when quality is endogenous due to the existence of the investment effect.
6 Alternative Equilibria
So far we have studied equilibria in which the firm signals high quality through its report
but not its price under Restriction 2. In this section we dispense with this restriction and
explore alternative equilibria in which price signaling may occur. Section 6.1 first shows that
our equilibrium from Proposition 1 survives common equilibrium refinements and that such
refinements have little bite in our game due to the assumption of symmetric costs. Therefore
to allow the refinements to have more power, Section 6.2 then introduces a small asymmetry
in the types’ marginal costs. We show that a Pareto-based criterion uniquely selects a
different but related equilibrium where price signaling may arise. Although this equilibrium
lacks some attractive features, its implications for policy are qualitatively similar to those
already derived.
6.1 Symmetric Costs
Under symmetric costs, we now retain Restriction 1 such that r(H) = H (for the reasons
outlined earlier) but relax Restriction 2. To simplify the exposition, we also focus on equilib-
ria in which the firm plays a pure strategy price conditional on a given report. Nevertheless,
as is typical in signaling games, there are still a lot of potential equilibria. In particular, there
is a continuum of pooling equilibria when φ < φ1, a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria
when φ < φ0, and a continuum of separating equilibria for all φ > 0.
17 Moreover as we
now demonstrate, common refinements have little bite due to the absence of single-crossing
in price following a high report. For instance, first consider a Pareto-based criterion which
rules out a PBE ω if it offers a strictly lower payoff to one sender type and a weakly lower
payoff to the other sender type, relative to some other PBE ω′.
16Similarly, a welfare-maximizing policymaker may still induce y∗ > 0.
17The interested reader is directed to Section B of the Supplementary Appendix for full details.
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Lemma 6. Given Restriction 1, the Pareto criterion selects the following:
i) When φ < φ1 the types pool on {r = H, p∗(q¯)}.
ii) When φ ∈ [φ1, φ0) the types semi-pool. The low type plays {r = H, psp} with any proba-
bility y ∈ [0, y∗], and {r = L, p∗(L)} with probability 1−y. The high type plays {r = H, psp},
where psp satisfies
pi∗(L) = psp
[
1−G
(
psp − xyL+ (1− x)H
1− x+ xy
)]
− φ,
and where y∗ is the same as in Proposition 1.
iii) When φ ≥ φ0 the types separate. The low type plays {r = L, p∗(L)} and the high type
plays {r = H, p∗(H)}.
The Pareto criterion admits our equilibrium from Proposition 1. However while the
Pareto criterion uniquely selects pooling when φ < φ1 and separating when φ ≥ φ0, it is
consistent with a broader continuum of semi-pooling equilibria when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0). These
semi-pooling equilibria differ in their levels of false advertising, y, and high report price,
psp. Intuitively, for different levels of y, the price psp adjusts to keep the low type willing
to randomize. Further, in each semi-pooling equilibrium, the low type earns pi∗(L) and the
high type earns pi∗(L) + φ.
Second, consider another common refinement, D1. This has little bite in our game
because, as explained above, the types’ payoff functions are not single-crossing in price
following a high report. In particular, the set of D1-equilibria form a (weak) superset of
those consistent with the Pareto criterion. Hence our equilibrium from Proposition 1 also
remains consistent with D1.
6.2 Asymmetric Costs
Given such equilibrium multiplicity, the main model used Restriction 2 to uniquely select
our chosen equilibrium. However, as an alternative, we now introduce a small asymmetry in
the types’ marginal costs. This still generates a large number of equilibria but it allows some
common refinements to have more power by introducing single-crossing following r = H. In
particular, now let c(i) denote the marginal cost of type i = L,H and assume c(L) = 0 <
c(H). We further denote pi (p, qe; i) as the gross profit of a firm with marginal cost c(i) when
it charges price p and is expected to have quality qe. Also let p∗ (qe; i) = arg maxp pi (p, qe; i)
and pi∗(qe; i) = pi (p∗ (qe; i) , qe; i).
We start by considering equilibria of the same economically appealing form as that in
Proposition 1. In particular consider a candidate equilibrium in which the high type sets
{r = H, psp}, whilst the low type randomizes between pooling with probability y, and setting
{r = L, p∗(L;L)} with probability 1 − y. Since the types have different costs they now
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disagree over their preferred pooling price psp. Suppose they pool on the high type’s preferred
price p∗(qeH ;H). This is consistent with the high type having some price ‘leadership’ since it
is the one being mimicked. Provided c(H)− c(L) is not too large, it is then straightforward
to prove that there exists an equilibrium which is qualitatively the same as in Proposition 1:
Remark 2. Suppose c(H)− c(L) is not too large. There exists a PBE in which:
i) A high type firm claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH ;H).
ii) A low type firm randomizes. With probability y∗ it claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH ;H).
With probability 1− y∗ it claims r = L and charges p∗(L;L).
- When φ ≤ φ′1 ≡ pi∗(p∗(q¯;H), q¯;L)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 1.
- When φ ≥ φ′0 = pi∗(p∗(H;H), H;L)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 0.
- When φ ∈ (φ′1, φ′0), y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and uniquely solves
pi∗(p∗(qeH ;H), q
e
H ;L)− φ = pi∗(L). (16)
iii) qeH is given by (6). Buyer beliefs are such that Pr (q = H|{r, p} = {H, p∗(qeH ;H)}) =
1−x
1−x+xy∗ and Pr (q = H|{r, p} 6= {H, p∗(qeH ;H)}) = 0.
In particular for intermediate values of φ, false advertising still arises in equilibrium,
varies smoothly with the policy strength, and induces buyers to positively update their
priors. Moreover, after slightly modifying Conditions 1 and 2 to take account of the cost
asymmetry it remains true that for relatively high values of L, H, and (1 − x) both a
buyer- and a welfare-orientated policymaker would permit a strictly positive level of false
advertising.18
We now consider other possible forms of equilibria. To ease exposition and to facilitate a
comparison with the main model, we henceforth focus on the limit case where c(H)→ c(L).
Firstly, under cost asymmetry, it is well-known that the D1 refinement uniquely selects the
following least-cost separating equilibrium:
Remark 3. Suppose Restriction 1 holds. In the limit as c(H)→ c(L), the least-cost separat-
ing equilibrium has the low type report r = L and charge p∗(L), and the high type report
r = H and charge ps, where ps = p∗(H) when φ ≥ φ0, and otherwise ps is the largest solution
to p[1−G(p−H)]− φ = pi∗(L).
Intuitively when φ is sufficiently large it is too costly for the low type to mimic. Conse-
quently the high type signals only through its report, and is able to charge the full information
price p∗(H). However, for lower φ, in addition to using a high report, the high type must
also signal by distorting its price above p∗(H) to further deter the low type. Notice however,
18However, relative to symmetric costs, there is now an additional reason to eradicate false advertising
because a lying low type must distort its price upwards at p∗ (qeH ;H) instead of its preferred (lower) price
p∗ (qeH ;L). This distortion provides a further loss to buyer surplus and total welfare.
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that in this equilibrium the low type never reports r = H. Hence this equilibrium cannot
explain the existence of false advertising, and so we do not consider it further. Mailath et al
(1993) also provide a number of wider arguments against the de facto selection of least-cost
separating equilibria. Secondly then, consider the Pareto-based criterion.
Lemma 7. Suppose Restriction 1 holds. As c(H)→ c(L) the Pareto criterion selects:
i) If φ < φ1, the types pool on {r = H, p∗(q¯)}.
ii) If φ ∈ [φ1, φ0), the types fully separate on {r = L, p∗(L)} and {r = H, p′} where p′ > p∗(H)
and is the largest solution to p[1−G(p−H)]− φ = pi∗(L).
iii) If φ ≥ φ0, the types fully separate on {r = L, p∗(L)} and {r = H, p∗(H)}.
The Pareto criterion now selects a unique equilibrium.19 As under symmetric costs, it
still selects pooling when φ < φ1, and separation with full information prices when φ ≥
φ0. However, when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0), the Pareto criterion now makes a unique prediction. In
particular, due to single-crossing, it selects the least-cost separating equilibrium where the
high type signals its quality through both its report and its distorted price.
Importantly, this equilibrium still exhibits false advertising for sufficiently low φ. How-
ever, compared to our equilibrium in Proposition 1 (and its asymmetric cost counterpart
above), it lacks two economically attractive features: false advertising i) never influences
buyers’ beliefs beyond their priors, and ii) does not vary smoothly in φ. Nevertheless, de-
spite these differences, we now show that the policy implications are qualitatively similar to
those in our original analysis. The following is a useful preliminary result:20
Remark 4. The policymaker optimally chooses φ such that price signaling does not arise
in equilibrium. In particular, any φ ∈ [φ1, φ0) is strictly dominated under a buyer surplus,
profit, or total welfare objective.
Intuitively price signaling is costly for both the firm and buyers because price is distorted
upwards above the full information level when quality is high. Hence the policymaker prefers
to choose either the full information outcome with φ ≥ φ0 or the full pooling outcome with
φ < φ1. Equivalently, in terms of our main model, this equates to a choice between y
∗ = 0 and
y∗ = 1 such that the policymaker either fully eliminates or fully permits false advertising. By
adapting past results, we can then state the following. Firstly, Proposition 3 implies that a
profit-oriented policymaker weakly prefers y∗ = 0. Secondly, under a buyer surplus objective,
the shape of v∗(q) again plays an important role. Under Condition 1 it is immediate that
y∗ = 0 is strictly preferred when H ≤ qˆv, and y∗ = 1 is weakly preferred when L ≥ qˆv. For
the remaining cases we find that:
19This same equilibrium is also uniquely selected by Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas’s (2000) Strongly Undefeated
Equilibrium refinement.
20In the context of a least cost separating equilibrium within a different model, Corts (2013) shows a
related result where price signaling is never optimal under a total welfare objective.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that Condition 1 holds and L < qˆv < H:
i) There exist values of L, H, and (1 − x) such that a buyer-oriented policymaker strictly
prefers y∗ = 1 over y∗ = 0.
ii) The buyer-optimal y∗ ∈ {0, 1} is increasing in L, H and (1− x).
Hence, there exists parameters where the price effect dominates the persuasion effect
such that buyer surplus is maximized by a positive level of false advertising with y∗ = 1.
Moreover in the same spirit as Corollary 1, y∗ = 1 is more likely to be optimal when
the market is ‘healthier’. Under Condition 2, a similar result can also be shown for total
welfare. Therefore the policy implications are qualitatively similar to those under our main
equilibrium. However these policy implications are somewhat less rich and realistic because,
unlike in our main analysis, the optimal level of false advertising is now ‘bang-bang’ and
moderate penalties are never predicted.
Finally, we note that this subsection also contributes to the literatures on quality disclo-
sure and price signaling.21 First, for a general set of demand conditions, Remark 4 shows
that both the firm and buyers always prefer full separation with full information prices or full
pooling to the possibility of price signaling. Second, Proposition 6 shows that full pooling
can be optimal for buyers and society even when truthful disclosure is costless, and when full
separation would involve no output distortions. Third, under our assumptions of two types
and a zero cost of truthful disclosure, the monopolist always weakly prefers full separation
and so its incentives to fully disclose are weakly excessive relative to the buyer or social
optimum.
7 Robustness
This final section shows how the results of the main model are robust to i) an arbitrary
number of quality types, and ii) an alternative, multiplicative form of utility.
7.1 An Arbitrary Number of Types
Suppose there are now n > 2 quality levels, denoted by q1 < ... < qn, and that the firm has
quality qi with probability xi ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the exposition, let q2 > q˜ and qn−1 < qˆv(relaxing these assumptions is straightforward, but adds no new insights). Marginal cost
is the same for all types and normalized to zero, while ex ante expected quality is again
denoted by q¯ =
∑
xiqi. The firm may send any report from the set Q = {q1, ..., qn}, and the
policymaker can commit to a richer penalty φ(q, r) ≥ 0, which depends on both the firm’s
actual and reported qualities. We assume that the firm can only be fined if it over-reports
its quality i.e. φ(q, r) = 0 for all r ≤ q. The game and move order are otherwise unchanged.
21See Bagwell (2007) and Dranove and Jin (2010) for respective reviews.
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As usual, for any particular penalty φ(q, r) there may exist a large number of PBE. There-
fore, for reasons analogous to the main model, we continue to apply versions of Restrictions
1 and 2 in which i) r(q) ≥ q ∀q such that no type under-reports its quality, and ii) buyer
beliefs depend on the firm’s claim but not its price. Notice that in any PBE satisfying these
restrictions, the penalty function φ(q, r) induces a mapping from quality types into reports.
It is then convenient to let y∗i,j be the probability that a firm of type i claims to have quality
j; hence y∗i,i denotes the probability that firm type i sends a truthful report. Letting y
∗ be
the (triangular) matrix of such probabilities, we may then state:
Lemma 8. The optimal penalty can be derived in two steps:
i) First, choose the matrix of probabilities y∗ which maximizes the policymaker’s objective.
ii) Second, there exists a penalty function φ(q, r) which induces the policymaker’s optimal y∗
as the unique equilibrium outcome of the game.
Thus conceptually the problem is similar to the two-type case. In particular, analogous
to Lemma 2, we can work with the matrix of report probabilities y∗, and be sure that at
least one penalty function can implement the desired y∗. Now consider optimal penalties.
Given our main model, it is not surprising that under certain conditions the policymaker
will permit some false advertising. However once there is an arbitrary number of types,
the policymaker also has to decide which quality types will be allowed to engage in false
advertising, and which quality level(s) they will mimic. To simplify the exposition we now
focus on distributions satisfying Conditions 1i and 2i for which qˆv = qˆw = q˜ :
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Proposition 7. Under Conditions 1i and 2i, the optimal report probabilities are as follows:
i) Buyer surplus. (a) When qn ≤ q˜ it is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. (b) When qn > q˜ > q¯
there exists a critical type i∗ satisfying E(q|q ≥ qi∗) ≤ q˜ < E(q|q ≥ qi∗+1), such that the
optimal solution has y∗i,i = 1 for all i < i
∗, y∗i,n = 1 for all i > i
∗, and y∗i∗,i∗ = 1− y∗i∗,n where
y∗i∗,n satisfies:
xi∗y
∗
i∗,nqi∗ +
∑n
i=i∗+1 xiqi
xi∗y∗i∗,n +
∑n
i=i∗+1 xi
= q˜.
(c) When q¯ ≥ q˜ it is maximized by y∗i,n = 1 for all i.
ii) Profit is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i.
iii) Total welfare. There exists a threshold L∗ such that: (a) When qn ≤ q˜ it is maximized
by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. (b) When qn > q˜ and qi∗ ≥ L∗ it is maximized by the buyer-optimal
matrix. (c) When qn > q˜ and qi∗ < L
∗, it is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i with qi < L
∗, and
y∗i,n = 1 for all i with qi ≥ L∗.
The policymaker induces each firm type to either report truthfully or to claim to have
the highest possible quality qn. Similar to the two-type model, in many cases one firm type is
22The optimal pattern of false advertising is qualitatively the same for distributions satisfying the alter-
native Conditions 1ii and 2ii. Further details are available on request.
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required to randomize over its report. Whether buyers gain from false advertising depends
upon how the highest quality type qn compares with q˜. If qn ≤ q˜ the persuasion effect
dominates, such that buyers are better off if the firm truthfully reveals its quality. However
if qn > q˜, the highest type has a lot of market power, and so lower types are pooled with
it to generate a beneficial price effect. In order to minimize the negative persuasion effect,
this pooling is done from the top i.e. first the qn−1 type is pooled, then the qn−2 type, and
so forth, until either E(q|r = qn) = q˜ or no more types are left to pool. Hence the optimum
has full pooling when q¯ > q˜, and semi-pooling when q¯ < q˜ < H . In the latter case, the
policymaker permits ‘small’ lies by types close to qn, whilst forbidding ‘large’ lies by types
at or close to q1.
Policy under a total welfare objective also depends upon whether qn ≷ q˜. When qn ≤ q˜ a
welfare-maximizing policy involves truthful advertising and so coincides with what is optimal
for both buyers and the firm. However when qn > q˜ a welfare-oriented policymaker may allow
some lower types to use false advertising in order to raise their output. As with buyer surplus,
types with quality closer to qn are more likely to be allowed to use false advertising since
their socially-optimal output levels are highest. Overall, the main insights from the two-type
model carry over into this richer multi-type environment.
7.2 Multiplicative Preferences
In the main model a buyer’s net utility is additive in quality and equal to q + ε − p. We
now show that our results do not qualitatively change when buyers have multiplicative
preferences (Mussa and Rosen 1978). In particular, suppose net utility now equals θq − p,
where θ represents a buyer’s privately known taste for quality which is drawn independently
across buyers using a distribution function F (θ) with support [θ, θ] where 0 ≤ θ < θ ≤
∞. The associated density f(θ) is strictly positive, continuously differentiable, and has an
increasing hazard rate. The firm has a strictly positive marginal cost denoted by c. All other
assumptions remain the same.
First consider the benchmark case in which the firm is known to have quality, q. A buyer
purchases the product if and only if θ ≥ p/q such that demand equals D(p/q) = 1−F (p/q).
The firm then chooses its optimal price p∗(q) to maximize (p− c) [1− F (p/q)]:
Lemma 9. Suppose the firm is known to have quality q, and define q˜m = c/θ¯. Also definecoverage quality q˜m, where q˜m = cf(θ)/ [θf (θ)− 1] if θf (θ) > 1, and otherwise q˜m = ∞.
Then
p∗(q) =

c if q ≤ q˜m
c+ q 1−F (p
∗(q)/q)
f(p∗(q)/q) if q ∈
(
q˜m, q˜m
)
θq if q ≥ q˜m
(17)
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When q ≤ q˜m quality is too low for the market to be active and so the firm’s price is
normalized to marginal cost without loss. When instead q ∈
(
q˜m, q˜m
)
the market is partially
covered and p∗(q) satisfies the standard first order condition. Unlike the main model, an
increase in q does not cause a parallel upward shift in the firm’s demand curve. Nevertheless
after differentiating (17) a firm with higher quality still charges more and sells to more
buyers. When quality is very large, optimal pricing depends on parameters. Mirroring the
main model let q˜m denote the quality at which the market becomes covered. Firstly when
θf (θ) ≤ 1, q˜m = ∞ such that the market never becomes fully covered. Intuitively the firm
never wishes to sell to buyers with the lowest types because either their willingness-to-pay
is too low or there are relatively too few of them. Here limq→∞ p∗(q)/q = θm where θm > θ
solves 1−F (θ)−θf(θ) = 0. Secondly when θf (θ) > 1 we have q˜m <∞, such that the market
becomes fully covered for sufficiently high quality, after which price tracks the willingness-
to-pay of the lowest type, with p∗(q) = θq. As before let pi∗(q) = (p∗(q)− c) [1− F (p∗(q)/q)]
denote the firm’s full information profit, which is strictly increasing in q > q˜m and strictlyconvex in q ∈ (q˜m, q˜m). Moreover for distributions where θf (θ) > 1, pi∗(q) is differentiable
around q = q˜m and then linear in q > q˜m. We also let v∗(q) =
´ θ¯q
p∗(q)(1 − F (mq ))dm denote
buyer surplus. As usual the shape of v∗(q) is important for our results, and we return to it
below.
Now suppose that the firm is privately informed about its quality. Under Restrictions 1
and 2, one can use similar steps to construct a semi-pooling equilibrium like that in the main
model. This has the following implications. Firstly the global convexity of pi∗(q) implies that
ex ante industry profit is again (weakly) maximized by a tough policy which eliminates false
advertising. Secondly consider buyer surplus. After some manipulations, expected buyer
surplus can again be written as in equation (8) from the main model. It turns out that
irrespective of whether θf (θ) ≷ 1, it is possible that a buyer-oriented policymaker permits
false advertising. However relative to additive utility the analysis is now more complicated
since there are more cases to consider. Therefore in order to simplify the exposition we focus
on distributions where θf (θ) > 1, and impose the following regularity condition:
Condition 1M. There exists a threshold qˆmv = q˜
m ∈ (q˜m,∞) such that v∗(q) is strictlyconvex for q ∈ (q˜m, qˆmv ) and linear for q > qˆmv , with limq↑qˆmv v∗q (q) > limq↓qˆmv v∗q (q) > 0 .
Like Condition 1 in the additive utility case, Condition 1M ensures that v∗(q) is s-shaped
in q. However notice that unlike in the main model, v∗(q) is strictly increasing in q even
once the market is fully covered. Intuitively, under market coverage, price is determined by
the willingness-to-pay of the lowest type θ, yet higher types benefit more from increases in
quality and so collect some rents. Hence Condition 1M ensures that v∗(q) follows an s-shape
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that is qualitatively more like total welfare within the additive utility case. To understand
when Condition 1M may apply, we note the following.
Lemma 10. Consider a distribution G(ε) on [a, b] that satisfies Condition 1. Truncate it
from below to generate a new distribution F (θ), which has density f(θ) = g(θ)/[1−G(θ)] with
θ ≥ max{a, 0} and θ¯ = b. F (θ) then satisfies Condition 1M with qˆmv = q˜m = cf(θ)/[θf (θ)−
1] ∈ (q˜m,∞) provided i) θ is sufficiently large and ii) limε→θ σ(ε) = −[1−G(ε)]g′(ε)/g(ε)2 >−∞.
Thus Condition 1M holds for any distribution that satisfies Condition 1, provided it is
sufficiently left-truncated. In light of our earlier results, it is then straightforward to verify
that i) if H ≤ qˆmv , y∗ = 0 is optimal; ii) if L ≥ qˆmv policy is indifferent; and otherwise:
Proposition 8. Suppose Condition 1M holds and L < qˆmv < H. Under a buyer surplus
objective, there exists a Lm < qˆmv such that:
i) If L ≤ Lm the policymaker optimally chooses y∗ = 0.
ii) If L > Lm the policymaker optimally chooses y∗ ∈ (0, 1].
As in the main model, an increase in false advertising generates related price and persua-
sion effects, with the former dominating when L and H are relatively large. Finally consider
a total welfare objective. Expected total welfare can be expressed as in equation (12) where
again w∗(q) = v∗(q) + pi∗(q). Note under Condition 1M, w∗(q) is guaranteed to be s-shaped
as both v∗(q) and pi∗(q) are strictly convex for q ∈ (q˜m, q˜m) and linear for q > q˜m. Hence,under Condition 1M, the policy implications are highly related to those in the main model
and those under the buyer surplus objective above. Indeed, using familiar methods, it is
easy to show that: i) if H ≤ q˜m, y∗ = 0 is optimal; ii) if L ≥ q˜m policy is indifferent, but iii)
if L < q˜m < H, a positive level of false advertising, y∗ > 0, is optimal for sufficiently high L.
8 Conclusions
Despite its prevalence and policy importance, false advertising remains under-studied. This
paper presents a model where false claims arise in equilibrium and actively influence the
purchase decisions of rational buyers. By utilizing some results on demand curvature, the
paper provides precise conditions under which buyers and society benefit from a positive
level of false advertising. Intuitively false advertising damages the credibility of high claims,
and so counteracts monopoly power via a novel ‘price’ effect. These results are robust to
a variety of extensions, such as endogenous product quality, asymmetric costs, an arbitrary
number of quality types, and an alternative multiplicative form of utility.
Our paper is not alone in arguing that policy may wish to induce false advertising by
limiting the associated expected penalty. Some other recent papers do this in different
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settings, where for example firms are uncertain about their quality or compete with an
asymmetric rival. The literature on law enforcement also suggests some broader reasons why
optimal policy may not be maximal (e.g. Polinsky and Shavell 2007). These include the
potential costs of detecting and punishing criminal activity, constraints relating to offenders’
ability to pay, and individuals’ attempts to avoid prosecution via socially costly activities.
Consequently, we do not intend to suggest that our documented price effect is the only
reason why it may be optimal to limit advertising regulation. Instead, our paper wishes
to highlight that i) the existence of false advertising may benefit buyers and society by
reducing the credibility of claims and thereby reducing prices, even in a world where other
explanations may not be relevant, ii) such price effects are economically intuitive, robust,
and widely applicable across many common market settings, and yet iii) the possibility of
such benefits seems to be completely ignored in current advertising regulation. Further
theoretical and empirical work to learn more about the optimal level, form, and enforcement
of advertising regulation is clearly a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. i) If q ≤ q˜ demand is zero for all p ≥ 0, so profit is weakly maximizedat p∗ = 0. ii) If q > q˜ profit is strictly increasing in p < a + q, therefore the optimal pricemust satisfy p∗ ≥ a+ q. At an interior solution, the first order condition is
1− pg (p− q)/ [1−G (p− q)] = 0. (18)
a) When q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
the left-hand side of (18) is strictly positive as p → a + q, strictly
negative as p → b + q, and strictly decreasing in p because 1 − G is logconcave. Hence a
unique p∗ solves equation (18). Define σ(ψ) = −[1−G(ψ)]g′(ψ)/g(ψ)2. Differentiating (18)
gives p∗q(q) = (1− σ(p∗(q)− q))/(2− σ(p∗(q)− q)), which lies in [0, 1) because logconcavity
of 1−G implies σ(ψ) ≤ 1. b). When q ≥ q˜ the left-hand side of (18) is strictly negative at
all p > a+ q and hence p∗ = a+ q.
Proof of Proposition 1. a) Using Restriction 2 we can define βeH = Pr (q = H|r = H)
and qeH = (1− βeH)L+ βeHH. Conditional on buyer beliefs, after reporting r = H the firm’s
price must maximize its profit and so it charges p∗(qeH). b) Using Restriction 1, Bayes’ rule
implies that Pr(q = H|r = L, p} = 0 if {r = L, p} is played in equilibrium. Therefore if in
equilibrium the firm reports r = L, it must also charge p∗(L). c) As y∗ = Pr (r(L) = H),
Bayes’ rule implies βeH = (1−x)/(1−x+xy∗). However Bayes’ rule places no restriction on
beliefs following a {r = L, p} which is off-path. d) y∗ must be consistent with the low type
behaving optimally. Firstly given y∗ = 0, r(L) = L is weakly dominant if and only if φ ≥ φ0.
Secondly given y∗ = 1, r(L) = H is weakly dominant if and only if φ ≤ pi∗(q¯)−pi∗ (qeL) where
pi∗ (qeL) is the maximum profit (given buyer beliefs) attainable with report r = L. This
condition holds for any φ ≤ φ1 given appropriate off-path beliefs, such as those specified in
the proposition. Thirdly given y∗ ∈ (0, 1), the low type must be indifferent between r = L
and r = H i.e. (5) must hold. Moreover y∗ ∈ (0, 1) implies qeH ∈ (q¯, H), such that equation
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(5) cannot hold for φ /∈ (φ1, φ0), but has a unique solution for any φ ∈ (φ1, φ0). e) Finally,
given buyer beliefs, it is indeed optimal for the high type to report r(H) = H.
Proof of Lemma 3. i) Consider L < qˆv. a) Under Condition 1i the shape of v
∗(q) implies
qˆv = q˜ <∞ and also that (10) is strictly negative for qeH < q˜ and strictly positive for qeH > q˜.
Hence q∗(L) = q˜. b) Under Condition 1ii the shape of v∗(q) implies that q˜ =∞, and hence
v∗(q) is continuously differentiable on (q˜, q˜). This all implies that (10) is strictly negative forqeH < qˆv, continuous at qeH = qˆv, strictly increasing in qeH for qeH > qˆv, and strictly positive
for sufficiently high qeH . To see the latter, note that we can write for q
e
H > qˆv that
∂E(v)
∂y∗
∝
ˆ qeH
qˆv
[
v∗q (z)− v∗q (qeH)
]
dz +
ˆ qˆv
max{q˜,L}
[
v∗q (z)− v∗q (qeH)
]
dz − (max{q˜, L} − L)v∗q (qeH) ,
(19)
which is strictly positive as qeH →∞ because v∗q (z) > v∗q (qeH) for all z ∈ (qˆv, qeH), and because
limq→∞ v∗q (q) = 0. Consequently (10) has a unique root q
∗(L) > qˆv, and is strictly negative for
qeH < q
∗(L) and strictly positive for qeH > q
∗(L). Furthermore notice that v∗q (q
∗(L)) > v∗q (L),
such that q∗(L) is strictly decreasing in L; also by definition limL→qˆv q
∗(L) = qˆv. c) Therefore
E(v) is quasiconcave in φ under Condition 1 because qeH strictly decreases in y
∗, and y∗
strictly decreases in φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]. ii) Consider L > qˆv. Under Condition 1, v∗(q) is weakly
increasing and concave in q > qˆv, so (10) is weakly positive. Hence E(v) is weakly decreasing
in φ.
Proof of Proposition 2. i) Note that qeH ≤ q∗(L) for all φ, so by Lemma 3 E(v) is
maximized at φ∗ ≥ φ0. ii) Note that qeH < q∗(L) when φ < pi∗(q∗(L))−pi∗(L), and qeH > q∗(L)
when φ > pi∗(q∗(L))− pi∗(L). Hence from Lemma, 3 E(v) is maximized at φ∗ = pi∗(q∗(L))−
pi∗(L) such that qeH = q
∗(L). iii) Note that qeH ≥ q∗(L) for all φ, hence by Lemma 3 E(v)
is maximized at φ∗ ≤ φ1. Finally, Proposition 1 gives the associated optimal y∗ for each
case.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using Proposition 2 optimal false advertising is
y∗ = min
{
max
{
(H − q∗(L))(1− x)
(H − q∗(L))(1− x) + q∗(L)− q¯ , 0
}
, 1
}
. (20)
Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that q∗(L) is weakly decreasing in L. Hence (20) is weakly
increasing in L, H, and (1− x).
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Proof of Proposition 3. Given E (Π) = xE (piL) + (1− x)E (piH), it is immediate from
(11) that a) E(Π) = pi∗(q¯)−xφ when φ < φ1, b) E(Π) = pi∗ (L)+(1− x)φ when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0],
and c) E(Π) = xpi∗(L)+(1−x)pi∗(H) when φ > φ0. Hence E(Π) is quasiconvex, minimized at
φ1, and cannot be maximized at any φ ∈ (0, φ0). Then for part i), φ = φ0 strictly dominates
φ = 0 because pi∗(q) is convex everywhere and strictly convex for q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
. For part ii)
note that pi∗(q) = a+ q for all q ≥ q˜, and hence E(Π) = a+ q¯ for any φ ∈ {0} ∪ [φ0,∞).
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that y∗ strictly decreases in φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]. i) When qeH < qˆw
Condition 2 implies that (14) is strictly negative. ii) Consider L < qˆw < q
e
H . Condition 2
implies that limq↑qˆw w
∗
q(q) > w
∗
q(q
e
H) > 0. (This is clear for Condition 2i. Condition 2ii implies
that q˜ = ∞ such that w∗(q) is continuously differentiable with limq↑qˆw w∗q(q) = w∗(qˆw).)
Hence the equation w∗q(Lˇ) = w
∗
q(q
e
H) has a unique solution Lˇ < qˆw. Condition 2 also implies
that (14) is strictly increasing in L < Lˇ, strictly decreasing in L > Lˇ, strictly positive at
L = Lˇ, and weakly positive as L→ qˆw. In addition because Condition 2 implies w∗q(qeH) > 0,
(14) is strictly negative for L < qeH − w∗(qeH)/w∗q(qeH). All of this allows us to conclude that
(14) has a unique root L∗(qeH) < Lˇ, and is strictly negative (positive) for L below (above)
L∗(qeH). Note that under Condition 2i q˜ = qˆw such that L
∗(qeH) is a constant which solves
v∗ (q˜)−v∗(L)+a−pi∗ (L)+L = 0. Note that under Condition 2ii L∗(qeH) is strictly decreasing
in qeH because (14) is strictly increasing in L evaluated around the point L = L
∗(qeH), and
also in qeH . Since in both cases L
∗(qeH) is weakly decreasing in q
e
H , and q
e
H is increasing in
φ, E(w) is quasiconcave in φ. iii) When L > qˆw Condition 2 implies that (14) is weakly
positive.
Proof of Proposition 4. First consider L ≤ L∗(H). Whenever qeH < qˆw Lemma 4i implies
that E(w) is strictly decreasing in y∗. Whenever qeH > qˆw Lemma 4ii implies that E(w) is
weakly decreasing in y∗ due to the fact that L∗(q) is a weakly decreasing function. Therefore
given our tie-break rule the optimum has y∗ = 0. Second consider L > L∗(H). Lemma 4ii
implies that E(w) is strictly increasing in y∗ starting from y∗ = 0, and hence the optimum
has y∗ > 0. To prove that y∗ = 1 can be optimal, it suffices to consider an example in which
L∗(q¯) < L < qˆw < q¯ such that E(w) is strictly increasing everywhere in y∗.
Proof of Lemma 5. Part i) follows from arguments in the text. For part ii) look for an
equilibrium in which a positive measure of types invest. Since pi∗(H) − pi∗(L) < ∞ not
all types invest, hence in any putative equilibrium x∗(φ) ∈ (0, 1). Under Restrictions 1
and 2 the equilibrium is semi-pooling with the same form as Proposition 1. a) Consider
φ = φ0. There is clearly an equilibrium with y
∗ = 0; since a high quality firm earns
pi∗(H) − pi∗(L) more than a low quality firm, x∗(φ0) = 1 − F (φ0). There is no equilibrium
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with y∗ > 0 as pi∗(qeH) − φ0 < pi∗(H) − φ0 = pi∗(L) such that no firm with q = L would
want to report r = H. b) Consider φ ∈ (0, φ0). There is no equilibrium with y∗ = 0, since
pi∗(qeH) − φ = pi∗(H) − φ > pi∗(L), such that a firm with q = L would deviate and report
r = H. Therefore look for an equilibrium with y∗ > 0. A high quality firm earns φ more
than a low quality firm, hence x∗(φ) = 1 − F (φ). Also the gain to a firm with q = L from
reporting r = H instead of r = L is pi∗(qeH)− φ− pi∗(L), or
pi∗
(
L+ (H − L) F (φ)
F (φ) + y∗ (1− F (φ))
)
− φ− pi∗(L). (21)
This is continuous and strictly decreasing in y∗, and is strictly positive at y∗ = 0. If (21) is
weakly positive at y∗ = 1 it is strictly positive at all y∗ ∈ [0, 1), hence there is a unique equi-
librium with y∗ = 1. If (21) is strictly negative at y∗ = 1, there exists a unique equilibrium
with y∗ ∈ (0, 1) which makes (21) equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. i) The proof that φ = 0 is never optimal is given in the text after
the proposition. ii) It is enough to show that ∂E(v)/∂φ|φ=φ0 < 0. Note that for φ ∈ (0, φ0],
pi∗ (qeH(φ)) = max {pi∗(L) + φ, pi∗ (L+ (H − L)F (φ))} , (22)
where the first part applies when y∗ ∈ (0, 1), and the second part applies when y∗ = 1.
Equation (22) implies that for some small δ > 0, pi∗ (qeH(φ)) = pi
∗(L)+φ for all φ ∈ [φ0−δ, φ0].
Using dqeH/dφ = 1/ (dpi
∗(qeH)/dq) and equation (15), ∂E(v)/∂φ|φ=φ0 is proportional to
(H − L)v∗q (H)− (v∗(H)− v∗(L))
pi∗q (H) (v∗(H)− v∗(L)) (H − L)
+
f(φ0)
F (φ0)
.
The first term is strictly negative since H > q∗(L), and dominates the second term provided
f(φ0)/F (φ0) is sufficiently small.
All remaining proofs for the paper are in Section C of the Supplementary Appendix.
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Supplementary Appendix
Section A: Further Information on Conditions 1 and 2
Lemma 11. Conditions 1’ and 2’ below are equivalent to Conditions 1 and 2 respectively:
Condition 1’. Let zv(ψ) = −σ′(ψ) + [2 − σ(ψ)]g(ψ)/[1 − G(ψ)]. The demand function
satisfies either i) q˜ <∞ and zv(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b), or ii) q˜ =∞, zv(ψ) changes from
negative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b), and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞.
Condition 2’. Let zw(ψ) = −σ′(ψ) + [2 − σ(ψ)][3 − σ(ψ)]g(ψ)/[1 − G(ψ)]. The demand
function satisfies either i) q˜ < ∞ and zw(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b), or ii) q˜ = ∞, zw(ψ)
changes from negative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b), and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞.
Proof. We proceed in a number of steps.
Step 1. Simple calculations reveal that v∗qq(q) ∝ zv (p∗(q)− q) and w∗qq(q) ∝ zw (p∗(q)− q)
for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜).Step 2. p∗(q) − q is continuous and strictly decreasing in q ∈ (q˜, q˜), with limq→q˜p∗(q) −q = b, and also limq→q˜ p∗(q) − q = a. The first part is straightforward and follows from
arguments in the text. The second part follows from the definition q˜ = −b, and the fact thatlimq→q˜p∗(q) = 0. The third part is immediate when q˜ <∞; when q˜ =∞, if to the contrarywe have limq→∞ p∗(q) − q = ψ′ > a then we also have limq→∞ p∗(q) = ∞, but this violates
the interior first order condition (18).
Step 3. Condition 1i implies 1i’, and Condition 2i implies 2i’. (A proof of the converse is
straightforward and omitted.) a) Since v∗(q) and w∗(q) are not differentiable around qˆv and
qˆw respectively, we must have qˆv = qˆw = q˜ <∞. b) Given Step 2, v∗qq(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜)implies that zv(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b). Similarly w∗qq(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜) implies thatzw(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b).
Step 4. Condition 1ii implies 1ii’, and Condition 2ii implies 2ii’. (A proof of the converse
is straightforward and omitted.) a) Since v∗(q) and w∗(q) are strictly increasing for all q > q˜we must have q˜ = ∞. b) Since v∗(q) and w∗(q) are continuously differentiable, v∗qq(q) and
w∗qq(q) are continuous. Combined with Step 2, v
∗
qq(q) ≷ 0 for q ≶ qˆv implies that zv(ψ)
changes from negative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b); similarly w∗qq(q) ≷ 0 for
q ≶ qˆw implies that zw(ψ) changes from negative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b).
c) Notice that for q > q˜ we have v∗q (q) = 1−G(p∗(q)−q)2−σ(p∗(q)−q) and w∗q(q) = [3−σ(p∗(q)−q)][1−G(p∗(q)−q)]2−σ(p∗(q)−q) .Using Step 2 limq→∞ v∗q (q) = 0 and limq→∞w∗q(q) = 1 both imply limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞.
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Now consider the following generalized setting in which demand equals s
[
1−G (p−q−µ
m
)]
,
where µ is a location parameter and m, s ∈ (0,∞) are stretch parameters (Weyl and Tirole
2012). This corresponds to a setting in which a mass s > 0 of buyers have unit demand, and
each buyer’s valuation is given by q + µ + mε with ε distributed according to G(ε). In the
main text we focus on the case µ = 0 and m = s = 1. However in fact:
Claim 1. If Conditions 1 and 2 hold for a demand 1 − G(p − q), they also hold for any
generalized demand of the form s
[
1−G (p−q−µ
m
)]
.
Proof. Consider Condition 1. In light of Lemma 11 it is sufficient to check that Condition
1’ holds. The market coverage point for this generalized demand is q˜(s,m, µ) = −µ +
m (−a+ 1/g(a)), hence q˜(s,m, µ) < ∞ if and only if q˜ < ∞. Let σ(ψ; s,m, µ) be the
curvature of the generalized demand form. We may then write the analogue of zv(ψ) for this
new demand as
zv(ψ; s,m, µ) = −dσ(ψ; s,m, µ)
dψ
+ [2− σ(ψ; s,m, µ)]
[
dsG
(
ψ−µ
m
)
dψ
/
s
[
1−G
(
ψ − µ
m
)]]
.
After solving for σ(ψ; s,m, µ) and substituting it in, then canceling terms:
zv(ψ; s,m, µ) =
1
m
[
−σ′
(
ψ − µ
m
)
+
[
2− σ
(
ψ − µ
m
)]
g
(
ψ−µ
m
)
1−G (ψ−µ
m
)] ∝ zv (ψ − µ
m
)
.
Moreover by the same logic as above limq→q˜(s,m,µ) ψ = a, and simple calculations reveal that
in the case of Condition 1ii limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞ if and only if limψ→a σ(ψ; s,m, µ) = −∞.
Hence zv(ψ; s,m, µ) satisfies Condition 1’ if and only if zv(ψ) satisfies it. The proof for
Condition 2 is very similar and so is omitted.
Specific Examples
We now show that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied by a wide range of common demand
curves. In light of Lemma 11 and Claim 1, it is sufficient to check Conditions 1’ and 2’ for
the case where s = m = 1 and µ = 0. For further related background material see Appendix
E in Fabinger and Weyl (2016).
1. Generalized Pareto Distribution: G(ψ) = 1 −
(
1− (1−σ)ψ
(2−σ)
) 1
1−σ
on
[
0, 2−σ
1−σ
)
for σ < 1,
and G(ψ) = 1 − e−ψ on [0,∞) for σ = 1. Special cases include the Uniform (σ = 0)
and Exponential (σ = 1) distributions. Note that q˜ = (2 − σ) < ∞ and σ(ψ) = σ. Hence
Conditions 1i’ and 2i’ are satisfied, because zv(ψ) ∝ (2−σ) > 0 and zw(ψ) ∝ (3−σ)(2−σ) >
0.
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2. Normal: G(ψ) =
´ ψ
−∞
e−x
2/2√
2pi
dx on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, and
σ(ψ) = ψ[1−G(ψ)]
g(ψ)
because g′(ψ) = −ψg(ψ). Hence limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
zv(ψ) ∝ 2
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
− 1− ψ2. (23)
Condition 1ii’ is satisfied because (23) is negative as ψ → −∞, is strictly increasing in ψ ≤ 0
since g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) is strictly increasing, and is strictly positive for all ψ ≥ 0. To prove the latter,
note that for all ψ ≥ 0 we have the lower bound g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) ≥
ψ+
√
ψ2+8/pi
2
(see Duembgen 2010).
In addition
zw(ψ) ∝ 6
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
− 4ψ g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) − 1 = 6
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
+ 4
g′(ψ)
1−G(ψ) − 1. (24)
Condition 2ii’ is satisfied. Firstly as ψ → −∞, (24) tends to −1. Secondly (24) is strictly
increasing in ψ < −1, because g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) and g
′(ψ) > 0 are both strictly increasing. Thirdly (24)
is strictly positive for all ψ ∈ [−1, 0]. This can be proved by noting that on this interval, we
have the lower bound g(ψ) ≥
(
1− ψ2
2
)
/
√
2pi, and the upper bound 1−G(ψ) ≤ 1
2
− xg(0).
Fourthly (24) is also strictly positive for all ψ > 0. This can be proved by noting that g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
strictly increasing implies both 2
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
> 2
(
g(0)
1−G(0)
)2
> 1 and 4
[(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
+ g
′(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
]
>
0.
3. Weibull: G(ψ) = 1 − e−ψα on [0,∞) where α > 1. Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞,
σ(ψ) = 1−
(
α−1
αψα
)
and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
zv(ψ) ∝ (α− 1)(ψα − 1) + αψ2α and zw(ψ) ∝ 2α2ψ2α + 3α(α− 1)ψα − (α− 1) (25)
Conditions 1ii’ and 2ii’ are both satisfied, since both expressions in (25) are strictly negative
as ψ → 0, strictly increasing in ψ and strictly positive as ψ →∞.
4. Power: G(ψ) = ψc on (0, 1] where c > 1. Note that q˜ = −1, q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) =c−1
c
[1− ψ−c] and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
zv(ψ) ∝
(c+ 1)
(c− 1)(ψ
c)2 + 2ψc − 1 and zw(ψ) ∝ (ψc)2
[(2c+ 1)(c+ 1)
c− 1
]
+ (4c+ 2)ψc − 1 (26)
Conditions 1ii’ and 2ii’ are both satisfied, since both expressions in (26) are strictly negative
as ψ → 0, strictly increasing in ψ and strictly positive as ψ → 1.
5. Type I Extreme Value (Max version): G(ψ) = e−e
−ψ
on (−∞,∞). Note q˜ = −∞,
q˜ =∞, σ(ψ) = (eψ−1)(ee−ψ −1) and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Numerical simulations show that
Conditions 1ii’ and 2ii’ are both satisfied.
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6. Logistic: G(ψ) = e
ψ
1+eψ
on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = 1 − e−ψand limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Condition 1ii’ is satisfied because zv(ψ) ∝ e2ψ − 1, which is single-
crossing from negative to positive at ψ = 0. However Condition 2’ is not satisfied since
zw(ψ) ∝ 2 + 2e−ψ, which is strictly positive everywhere.
7. Type I Extreme Value (Min version): G(ψ) = 1 − e−eψ on (−∞,∞). Note that
q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = 1 − e−ψ and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Condition 1ii’ is satisfiedbecause zv(ψ) ∝ e−ψ(1 − e−ψ) + 1, which is single-crossing from negative to positive at
ψ = ln
(
−1+√5
2
)
. However Condition 2’ is not satisfied since zw(ψ) ∝ 2 + 3e−ψ, which is
strictly positive everywhere.
8. Mirror Image Pareto: G(ψ) = (−ψ)−β on (−∞,−1] with β > 0. Note that q˜ = 1,
q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = [1−(−ψ)β ](1+β)
β
and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Define h = (−ψ)β. Condition 1ii’ is
satisfied because zv(ψ) ∝ −h2+2h+ β−1β+1 , which is single-crossing from negative to positive as
it is strictly negative as ψ → −∞, strictly increasing in ψ, and strictly positive as ψ → −1.
However Condition 2’ is not satisfied as zw(ψ) ∝ h2 + 2(2β − 1)h + (β−1)(2β−1)(1+β) , which is
strictly positive everywhere.
Section B: Further Information on Alternative Equilibria
This section provides further information on the alternative equilibria discussed in Section
6.1 under symmetric costs.
Pooling equilibria: Here both types report r = H and charge a price pp which satisfies
pi∗(L) ≤ pp[1−G(pp − q¯)]− φ . (27)
To understand this inequality, note that on the equilibrium path buyers maintain their prior
belief that quality is q¯. Therefore in a pooling equilibrium the two types earn pp[1−G(pp−
q¯)] − φ and pp[1 − G(pp − q¯)] respectively. Even with the most pessimistic off-path beliefs,
each type can guarantee a payoff pi∗(L) by reporting r = L and charging p∗(L). Therefore
the low type has more incentive to deviate, but prefers not to do so provided that (27) holds.
Notice that the right-hand side of (27) has a maximum value of pi∗(q¯)− φ. Therefore (27) is
satisfied for at least one price pp if and only if φ ≤ φ1, and so only under this condition does
a full pooling equilibrium exist. Generically many different pooling prices are compatible
with (27), but both types prefer to pool on the equilibrium with pp = p∗(q¯).
Semi-pooling equilibria: In these equilibria the high type reports r = H and charges a
price psp, while the low type randomizes. In particular with probability y the low type pools
with the high type, and with probability 1 − y separates by reporting r = L and charging
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p∗(L). The price psp and probability of false advertising y must jointly satisfy
pi∗(L) = psp[1−G(psp − qe)]− φ , (28)
where qe = xyL+(1−x)H
1−x+xy is buyers’ Bayesian updated belief about quality after observing a
report r = H and price psp.23 To understand this condition, note that after reporting r = H
and charging psp, the two types earn respectively psp[1−G(psp−qe)]−φ and psp[1−G(psp−qe)].
However since the low type can also secure pi∗(L) by reporting truthfully and charging its
full-information price, condition (28) is required to ensure that it randomizes.24 Notice
that the right-hand side of (28) has a maximum value of pi∗(H)− φ, and so a semi-pooling
equilibrium exists if and only if φ ≤ φ0. Generically a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria
exist because many values of y and psp are consistent with condition (28). In particular when
φ ≤ φ1 every y ∈ [0, 1] is associated with at least one semi-pooling equilibrium, while when
φ ∈ (φ1, φ0] every y ∈ [0, y∗] is associated with at least one semi-pooling equilibrium, where
y∗ is as defined in Proposition 1. Importantly however, all semi-pooling equilibria are payoff
equivalent. This is because in all of them the low type earns pi∗(L), whilst the high type’s
payoff psp[1−G(psp − qe)] always equals pi∗(L) + φ as implied from (28).
Separating equilibria: Here, the low type reports r = L and charges p∗(L), whilst the
high type reports r = H and charges a price ps which satisfies
pi∗(L) ≤ ps[1−G(ps −H)] ≤ pi∗(L) + φ (29)
To understand this condition, note that in equilibrium buyers perfectly infer quality, and
hence the two types earn respectively pi∗(L) and ps[1 − G(ps − H)]. The high type could
deviate to price p∗(L) (and either report) and receive a payoff of pi∗(L), so the first inequality
is needed to ensure this deviation is unprofitable. The low type could deviate by mimicking
the high type and earn ps[1−G(ps −H)]− φ, so the second inequality is needed to ensure
this deviation is unprofitable. Notice that a separating equilibrium exists for all values of
φ because there is always at least one price ps which satisfies (29). Generically there is a
whole continuum. The low type is indifferent over all such equilibria, earning pi∗(L) in each.
The high type prefers to play a least-cost separating equilibrium, which i) for φ < φ0 is any
price ps which solves ps[1−G(ps−H)] = pi∗(L) + φ, and ii) for φ ≥ φ0 enables it to play its
full-information price ps = p∗(H). Notice that for φ < φ0 the high type is forced to engage
in price signaling by distorting its price away from the full-information level to prevent the
low type from mimicking. Hence in the high type’s preferred separating equilibrium it earns
min{pi∗(H), pi∗(L) + φ}.
23Depending on the setting, in the text we sometimes refer to the semi-pooling equilibrium with y ∈ {0, 1}
as separating or pooling respectively.
24Neither type has an incentive to deviate given condition (28) and appropriate off-path beliefs.
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Section C: Remaining Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6. In Section B of the Supplementary Appendix we proved the following.
First, pooling equilibria exist if and only if φ ≤ φ1, and the Pareto dominant pooling
equilibrium price equals p∗(q¯), which gives respective payoffs pi∗(q¯) − φ and pi∗(q¯). Second,
semi-pooling equilibria exist if and only if φ ≤ φ0, take the same form as described in Lemma
6, and always give respective payoffs pi∗(L) and pi∗(L) + φ. Third, separating equilibria
always exist, and the Pareto dominant separating equilibria give respective payoffs pi∗(L)
and min{pi∗(H), pi∗(L) + φ}. Lemma 6 then follows immediately. Note that when φ = φ1
the Pareto dominant pooling equilibrium is a special case of the semi-pooling equilibrium
with y = 1 and psp = p∗(q¯). Also note that when φ < φ0 the least-cost separating equilibria
are special cases of the semi-pooling equilibria with y = 0. Finally when φ = φ0 there exists
only one semi-pooling equilibrium, and it has y = 0 and psp = p∗(H), such that formally it
is the least-cost separating equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7. As a preliminary step, we build on Section B of the Supplementary
Appendix to briefly describe the equilibria under asymmetric costs when c(H)−c(L) is close
to zero. Firstly, pooling equilibria where both types charge pp exist if and only if φ ≤ φcL1
where
φcL1 ≡ (p∗(q¯, L)− c(L))[1−G(p∗(q¯, L)− q¯)]− pi∗(L;L) > 0 . (30)
Define Pareto dominant pooling equilibria as follows: pooling equilibria where there is not
another pooling equilibrium which gives weakly more to one firm type and strictly more to the
other firm type. Then the Pareto dominant pooling equilibria are those with pp ∈ [p∗(q¯, L), p′]
where p′ = min{p∗(q¯, H), p′′} and p′′ is the largest solution to φ = (p′′ − c(L))[1 − G(p′′ −
q¯)] − pi∗(L;L). The low type earns (weakly) more than pi∗(L;L) and the high type earns
(pp− c(H))[1−G(pp− q¯)]. Secondly, in a semi-pooling equilibrium the low type mimics the
high type by reporting r = H and charging psp with probability y, where psp and y satisfy
pi∗(L;L) = (psp − c(L))[1−G(psp − qe)]− φ , (31)
and where qe = xyL+(1−x)H
xy+1−x . It can be shown that such an equilibrium exists if φ ≤ φ′ where
φ′ > φcL1 , and also that at least one equilibrium has y = 0. Notice that (31) generically has
two solutions since the right-hand side is quasiconcave in psp, and that as y decreases the
larger of these solutions increases. Note also that at φ = φcL1 the unique pooling equilibrium
is part of a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria. Notice further that the high type’s payoff
(psp− c(H))[1−G(psp− qe)] can be rewritten with the help of (31) as pi∗(L;L) +φ− (c(H)−
c(L))pi
∗(L;L)+φ
psp−c(L) , whereupon it is clear that the high type strictly prefers the semi-pooling
equilibrium with y = 0 and the largest psp that solves (31). Define Pareto dominant semi-
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pooling equilibria as follows: semi-pooling equilibria where there is not another semi-pooling
equilibrium which gives weakly more to one firm type and strictly more to the other firm
type. Hence for a given φ ≤ φ′, the the Pareto dominant semi-pooling equilibrium has y = 0
and the largest psp that solves (31). Third, it is straightforward to show that the Pareto
dominant separating equilibrium (defined in a similar way to above) is least-cost. After
defining
φcL0 = (p
∗(H;H)− c(L))[1−G(p∗(H;H)−H)]− pi∗(L;L) , (32)
one can show that for φ < φcL0 the least cost separating equilibrium coincides with the
Pareto dominant semi-pooling equilibrium, and otherwise for φ ≥ φcL0 has the high type
charge p∗(H;H). Note that for small c(H)− c(L) we have φcL0 > φcL1 .
Lemma 7 is then proved as follows. Firstly for φ ≥ φcL1 the Pareto dominant equilibrium
has least-cost separation as described above. Secondly consider φ < φcL1 . The low type
weakly prefers to pool on pp ∈ [p∗(q¯, L), p′]. The high type’s pooling payoff is minimized
within this set at p∗(q¯;L). Meanwhile given φ < φcL1 the high type’s payoff in a least-cost
separating equilibrium is (weakly) less than the case where it charges psp∗ where p
sp
∗ solves
equation (31) for φ = φcL1 and y = 0.
25 Hence the high type strictly prefers to pool rather
than play a least-cost separating equilibrium provided φ < φcL2 where
φcL2 = (p
∗(q¯;L)−c(H))[1−G(p∗(q¯;L)− q¯)]−pi∗(L;L)+(c(H)−c(L))[1−G(psp∗ −H)] . (33)
Some manipulations show that φcL2 < φ
cL
1 .
26 Therefore for φ < φcL2 Pareto dominant equilibria
involve pooling on any of the prices described above, whilst for φ ∈ [φcL2 , φcL1 ) further work
is required to determine the Pareto dominant outcome. Thirdly however, notice that as
c(H) → c(L), we have φcL0 → φ0, φcL1 , φcL2 → φ1, p∗(q¯, L), p∗(q¯, H) → p∗(q¯) and p∗(q; q) →
p∗(q).
Proof of Remark 4. It suffices to show that φ ≥ φ0 strictly dominates all φ ∈ [φ1, φ0).
Firstly buyer surplus is strictly higher for φ ≥ φ0, since buyers pay the same price when
q = L but a strictly lower price when q = H. Secondly consider profits. The low type is
indifferent. However the high type prefers φ ≥ φ0 since its limit payoff is pi∗(L) + φ when
φ ∈ [φ1, φ0), but pi∗(H) when φ ≥ φ0. Thirdly since in both cases there is full separation,
25To see this, note that since φ < φcL1 < φ
cL
0 the largest solution to (31) when y = 0 must satisfy
psp > p∗(H;H) and hence the high type is better off when φ is larger, since then the largest solution to (31)
when y = 0 falls closer to p∗(H;H).
26This holds provided that 1 − G(p∗(q¯, L) − q¯) > 1 − G(psp∗ − H). To prove this, proceed in two steps.
First, note that psp∗ > p∗(q¯, L). This is because as shown in the preceding footnote p
sp
∗ > p∗(H;H), and
p∗(H;H) > p∗(H;L) > p∗(q¯, L). Second, since φ < φcL1 we have both (p
∗(q¯, L)− c(L))[1−G(p∗(q¯, L)− q¯)] ≥
pi∗(L;L) + φ and (psp∗ − c(L))[1 − G(psp∗ − H)] = pi∗(L;L) + φ which are only compatible if (p∗(q¯, L) −
c(L))[1−G(p∗(q¯, L)− q¯)] ≥ (psp∗ − c(L))[1−G(psp∗ −H)]. However since psp∗ > p∗(q¯, L) this can only hold if
1−G(p∗(q¯, L)− q¯) > 1−G(psp∗ −H).
44
welfare is just the sum of industry profit and buyer surplus, and so it too is maximized by
φ ≥ φ0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Define ∆ = xv∗(L) + (1 − x)v∗(H) − v∗(xL + (1 − x)H). Also
define q¯(x) = xL+ (1− x)H. As a preliminary step, note that if H ≤ q∗(L) we have ∆ ≥ 0.
Therefore henceforth we assume H > q∗(L), and define x′ ∈ (0, 1) such that q¯(x′) = q∗(L),
and also x¯ ∈ [x′, 1) such that q¯(x¯) = qˆv.
First consider how ∆ varies with x. Notice that ∆(x = 0) = ∆(x = 1) = 0 and
∆x(x = 1) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ (H − L)v∗q (L)− v∗(H) + v∗(L) ≥ 0 . (34)
Condition 1 implies that ∆xx ≥ 0 for x ∈ (0, x¯), and ∆xx < 0 for x ∈ (x¯, 1). Lemma 3
implies that ∆(x = x′) < 0. Therefore if (34) holds, ∆ < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). If (34) does
not hold, there exists an x′′ > x′ satisfying ∆(x = x′′) = 0, such that ∆ < 0 for x ∈ (0, x′′),
and ∆ > 0 for x ∈ (x′′, 1). Part i of the proposition then follows immediately, as does the
comparative static in (1− x) in part ii of the proposition.
Second consider comparative statics in L. a) The left-hand side of (34) is increasing in
L, so if (34) holds initially it also holds for higher values of L. b) Suppose (34) does not
hold, in which case
∂x′′
∂L
= −x′′v
∗
q (L)− v∗q (q¯(x′′))
∆x(x = x′′)
.
We need to prove this is positive. Notice that ∆x(x = x
′′) > 0 because ∆ is single-crossing
in x around x = x′′. Hence we must prove that v∗q (q¯(x
′′)) > v∗q (L). To do this, note that
x′′ > x′ implies q¯(x′′) < q∗(L). Under Condition 1i q∗(L) = q˜ and it is then immediate
that v∗q (q¯(x
′′)) > v∗q (L). Under Condition 1ii, we know from the proof of Lemma 3 that
v∗q (q
∗(L)) > v∗q (L), such that it is again immediate that v
∗
q (q¯(x
′′)) > v∗q (L). Hence in both
cases the comparative static for L in part ii of the proposition holds.
Third consider comparative statics in H. a) A necessary condition for (34) to hold under
Condition 1ii is v∗q (L) > v
∗
q (H). Moreover the derivative of the left-hand side of (34) with
respect to H is v∗q (L)−v∗q (H), which is positive under Condition 1i since v∗q (L) > 0 = v∗q (H),
and is also positive under Condition 1ii if (34) holds. Hence if (34) holds initially, it also
holds if we increase H. b) Suppose (34) does not hold, in which case
∂x′′
∂H
= −(1− x′′)v
∗
q (H)− v∗q (q¯(x′′))
∆x(x = x′′)
.
We need to prove this is positive i.e. prove that v∗q (q¯(x
′′)) > v∗q (H). Again note that x
′′ > x′
implies q¯(x′′) < q∗(L). Under Condition 1i q∗(L) = q˜ and it is immediate that v∗q (q¯(x
′′)) >
0 = v∗q (H). Under Condition 1ii some manipulations show that v
∗
q (q¯(x
′′)) > v∗q (H) must
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also hold.27 Hence in both cases the comparative static for H in part ii of the proposition
holds.
Proof of Lemma 8 and Proposition 7. We prove Lemma 8 and Proposition 7 together,
in several steps.
1) Given that beliefs depend on the firm’s report and not its price, E(q|r) fully determines
prices. Hence y∗ is necessary and sufficient to write down expected buyer surplus, total
welfare, and profit (before penalties are deducted). Lemma 8i then follows (we return to 8ii
later).
2) Buyer surplus. Firstly, buyer surplus is not maximized if any report r = qi<n is sent by
more than one type. To see why, consider a new triangular matrix with y′i,i =
∑n−1
j=1 y
∗
i,j and
y′i,n = y
∗
i,n for all i < n. Strict convexity of v
∗(q) ∈ (q˜, q˜) implies that buyer surplus is strictlyhigher, by Jensen’s inequality. Secondly, buyer surplus is not maximized if E(q|r = qn) > q˜
and y∗i,n < 1 for some i < n. This is because the derivative of expected buyer surplus
with respect to y∗i,n is xi [v
∗(q˜)− v∗(qi)] > 0. Thirdly, buyer surplus is not maximized if
E(q|r = qn) = q˜, and there exists some j < k such that y∗k,n < 1 but y∗j,n > 0. To see this,
note that
∂y∗j,n
∂y∗k,n
∣∣∣
E(q|r=qn)=q˜
= −xk(q˜−qk)
xj(q˜−qj) . The derivative of E(v) with respect to y
∗
k,n, whilst
adjusting y∗j,n to ensure E(q|r = qn) = q˜, is proportional to
(q˜ − qj) [v∗(q˜)− v∗(qk)]− (q˜ − qk) [v∗(q˜)− v∗(qj)] ,
which is strictly positive since v∗(q) is strictly convex. Proposition 7i then follows.
3) Profit. Since pi∗(q) is convex, and strictly so for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), a similar approach to thefirst part of the previous step shows that expected profit (before penalties are deducted) is
maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. Hence expected profit once penalties are deducted, is also
maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i, and Proposition 7ii follows.
4) Total welfare. Firstly, total welfare is not maximized if any report r = qi for i < n is
sent by more than one type, and the proof is similar to that for buyer surplus. Secondly,
if E(q|r = qn) > q˜ and there exists some i < n with y∗i,n < 1, total welfare is increasing
in y∗i,n if and only if qi ≥ L∗. To see this, the derivative of E(TW ) with respect to y∗i,n is
v∗ (q˜) + a+ qi− v∗(qi)− pi∗(qi), which is positive if and only if qi exceeds a threshold (which
we call L∗). Thirdly, total welfare is not maximized if E(q|r = qn) = q˜, and there exists
some j < k such that y∗k,n < 1 but y
∗
j,n > 0. The proof closely follows the same arguments
for buyer surplus. Proposition 7iii then follows.
5) Implementation. Note that the maximum gain from false advertising is φ¯ = pi∗(qn)−pi∗(q1).
27This is immediate if q¯(x′′) ≥ qˆv. Suppose instead that q¯(x′′) < qˆv. If in fact v∗q (q¯(x′′)) ≤ v∗q (H) this would
imply v∗(H) ≥ v∗(q¯(x′′)) + (H − q¯(x′′))v∗q (q¯(x′′)). However since (1− x′′)(H − q¯(x′′)) = x′′(q¯(x′′)−L), this
in turn would imply ∆(x = x′′) ≥ x′′ [(q¯(x′′)− L)v∗q (q¯(x′′)) + v∗(L)− v∗(q¯(x′′))], which is strictly positive
given the properties of v∗(q). Hence, this yields a contradiction since ∆(x = x′′) = 0 by definition .
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First, set φ(qi, qj) = φ¯ for all j /∈ {qi, qn} so that in any equilibrium, each firm either
reports truthfully or reports r = qn. Second, for any type i for whom y
∗
i,i = 1, also set
φ(qi, qn) = φ¯. Third, for any type i for whom y
∗
i,n = 1, set φ(qi, qn) = 0. Fourth, let
qen = (
∑n
j=1 xjy
∗
j,nqj)/(
∑n
j=1 xjy
∗
j,n). For any type i for whom y
∗
i,i = 1− y∗i,n and y∗i,n ∈ (0, 1)
(there is at most one such i) set φ(qi, qn) = pi
∗(qen)− pi∗(qi). Fifth, it is easy to see there is a
unique equilibrium outcome in which y∗ is played, and so Lemma 8ii follows.
Proof of Lemma 9. Profit is quasiconcave in p because the hazard rate is increasing. (i)
When q ≤ q˜m no price above marginal cost can attract any demand and so the market isinactive. (ii) Suppose q > q˜m. An interior solution must satisfy the following first ordercondition
1− F (p/q)
f (p/q)
−
(p− c
q
)
= 0 . (35)
Notice that the left-hand side is decreasing in p/q, and so there exists an interior solution
if the left-hand side is strictly positive when evaluated at p/q = θ, and strictly negative at
p/q = θ¯. In addition to q > qm˜, this requires 1/f (θ)−θ+ cq > 0. The former necessarily holdsif θf (θ) ≤ 1; if instead θf (θ) > 1, it holds if q < q˜m ≡ cf(θ)/[θf (θ)− 1]. (iii) If θf (θ) > 1
and q ≥ q˜m then a corner solution arises as the first derivative of profit is negative for all
p/q ∈ [θ, θ¯]. At this point, the optimal price equals the willingness-to-pay of the marginal
buyer θq.
Proof of Lemma 10. Observe that for any θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] demand curvature is the same under
both F and G. First note that the market can now be covered if and only if q˜m < ∞ or
θf (θ) > 1, which is equivalent to θg(θ)/[1 − G(θ)] > 1. The inequality holds i) at θ = b
for any distribution with b < ∞ since g(b) > 0 by assumption, and ii) as θ → b for any
distribution with b = ∞ since the hazard rate is strictly positive and weakly increasing.
Notice also that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in θ due to the increasing hazard
rate. Hence the market is covered for sufficiently high θ. Second simple manipulations show
that v∗qq(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (q˜m, q˜m) if and only if zv(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯], where zv(θ)is defined in the Supplementary Appendix. Moreover Condition 1 ensures the latter holds
provided that θ is sufficiently high. Third, it is simple to verify that v∗q (q) = E(θ) − θ for
q > qˆmv , which is strictly less than limq↑qˆmv v
∗
q (q) provided that limε→θ σ(ε) > −∞.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof follows easily from earlier arguments and is therefore
omitted.
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